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This thesis constructs an original model of defense for Russia. This model
is developed in the context of Russia's current military situation, but can easily be
adapted to other nations. It explains the geographic extent that a nation will
defend through the interplay of two factors: the cost of defense and the propensity
to defend.
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union
have left Russian forces based in potentially hostile territory which is logistically
insupportable in the event of hostilities. To support its troops, Moscow must re-
deploy them and prepare new theaters of military operations. The requirement for
prepared theaters was discussed by the Russian military strategist, A. A. Svechin.
However, first Moscow must determine where wars are likely, and what territory
it will defend.
The model draws upon the work of Halford Mackinder, Johann von Thunen,
Yi-Fu Tuan, and Walter Christaller. The model addresses the complexity of the
elements which compose the cost of defense and the propensity to defend. These
elements can come into conflict with each other over specific geographic areas.
Three regions of conflict are addressed: the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Ukraine.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis constructs an original model of defense for Russia. This model
is developed in the context of Russia's current military situation, but can easily be
adapted to other nations. It explains the geographic extent that a nation will
defend through the interplay of two factors: the cost of defense and the propensity
to defend.
The thesis begins with the thought of the Russian military strategist of the
1920's and 1930's, General-Major A. A. Svechin. Svechin and his thought have
undergone a remarkable rehabilitation in recent years due to his intellectual
objectivity, his application of historical principles, and his discussion of operational
art. The latter is a term he coined to refer to that portion of military art lying
between tactics and strategy. Operational art requires the management of large
assets over a broad geographic area. To be most effective, it requires the
preparation of a theater of military operations, including identifying potential
enemies, the strategic axes to be used, development of highways and railroads,
the construction of logistics bases, and even the equipping and training of troops
for a particular theater.
Due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia no longer has a prepared theater of military operations along its
southern and western borders. Before these theaters can be prepared, the
question "What will Moscow defend?" must be answered. The model constructed
in this thesis is an attempt to answer this question.
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The model draws upon the work of Halford Mackinder, Johann von Thiinen,
Yi-Fu Tuan, and Walter Christaller. Mackinder developed the "Heartland" thesis
which stated that control of central Eurasia would allow a nation to control the
world. Mackinder is important for the author's model of defense because he saw
geo-strategy in terms of expansion from a secure core area to a more vulnerable
periphery.
Johann von Thiinen created a model to explain differences in agricultural
land use based upon the costs of sending goods to market. The author has
adapted this to explain defense behavior. With increasing distance from the core
area, the cost of defense increases. In the case of an expeditionary force sent its
base, the size and complexity of the logistics train increases with distance. In the
case of a static defense, such as a net of air defense sites, the cost similarly
increases with an increase in the radius of the area defended. This half of the
model of defense, the cost of defense, concerns what a nation can afford to
defend.
The second half of the model is what a nation will want to defend, termed
the propensity to defend. Here the work of the humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan
is helpful. He has coined the term topophilia, to refer to the affective bond
between people and place. Some elements of the propensity to defend are
ethnicity, cultural ties, economic value, historic ties, political integrity, the need for
collective defense, and even a people's psychology and their vision of the world
and their place in it.
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When the cost of defense and the propensity to defend are combined, the
model can be analyzed abstractly. At the core, the value placed on the land is
high and costs to defend it are low. The nation will therefore defend this area.
With increasing distance from the core, costs rise and the value placed on the
territory decreases. This progresses to an equilibrium point which is the furthest
point a nation will militarily defend. Beyond this point, costs are too high, and the
national interest is too low. The equilibrium point may change over time due to
technological, economic, or political changes. This is the first stage of the model.
The model of defense then adds additional actors, and progresses by
applying the work of Walter Christaller. Christaller developed "Central Place
Theory" which explains the settlement pattern of small villages, medium-sized
towns, and large cities. An economic system is made up of many different goods
and services. To acquire certain goods, a person is willing to travel only a short
distance. These are called "low-order" goods. Other goods attract customers from
a wider geographic extent, or "tributary area." These are "high-order goods." For
Christaller, the pattern of settlements is caused by the overlap of the tributary
areas of economic goods of various orders. Villages offer only low-order goods;
medium-sized towns offer low- and medium-order goods, and large cities offer
goods of all orders.
Central Place theory is applied to the model of defense by treating the
elements of the propensity to defend as analogs of economic goods of various
orders. Ethnicity in Armenia is a low-order good: it is satisfied in a relatively
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compact area. Other goods, such as collective defense are high-order: they can
only be satisfied over a larger geographic extent. When the various elements of
the propensity to defend overlap, they become the sources of conflict along the
periphery of Russia because they assert competing claims over the same territory.
The model is given application in three areas around Russia's periphery: the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and Ukraine. Ethnicity as an element of the propensity
to defend is applied to the Caucasus, the element of collective security to Central
Asia, and the element of historical ties as expressed in the Russian-Ukrainian
relationship is applied to Ukraine. These applications illustrate and serve to
temper the model.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the need for area specialists. The
various elements of the propensity to defend are very complex. They require a
thorough knowledge of the culture and history of the people. Without analysts with
such detailed knowledge, the United States will be surprised by unanticipated and
misunderstood conflicts throughout the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
We must be able to get a grasp of war as it is perceived by the opposing
side and clarify the other side's desires and goals. (Svechin, 1992, p.62)
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union
have caused profound changes in the political, economic, and social life of Central
and Eastern Europe. The armed forces of the Russian Federation have by no
means been immune to these changes. The change in collective security status
and the creation of new, independent states has meant that a large portion of the
armed forces of the former Soviet Union have suddenly found themselves
logistically stranded, cut off from any hope of re-supply in the event hostilities
break out. Their positions are largely indefensible. Until they are re-positioned
and new logistics lines and bases are constructed to support them in these new
locations, the situation will not improve.
The solution to this current dilemma of the Russian armed forces raises a
larger issue. Russia cannot re-deploy its divisions until it first defines its security
interests. In the political circles of Moscow today, there is much debate over this
issue.
This thesis is "A Model of Defense for Russia," and the central question of
this model is "what will Moscow defend?" Until this question is determined, the
Russian Federation will be unable to begin reconstruction of its armed forces. The
manner in which it is answered will largely determine the future size and structure
of these forces. The thesis will begin with the work of the Russian military
strategist, General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin (1878-1938). The
strategic theories of General-Major Svechin are particularly pertinent to this issue.
He developed the term "operational art" to refer to that level of military art lying
between strategy and tactics. Operational art requires the coordination of large-
scale military actions over a wide geographic extent, called the theater of military
operations. For Svechin, the preparation of the theater of military operations
requires identifying potential enemies, the locations of likely conflicts, the strategic
axes to be used, and the overall strategy being pursued. Only when these are
determined can the logistics and mobilization infrastructure be developed which
can support an operational victory.
The thesis will develop an original model of defense to theoretically answer
the question, "what will Moscow defend?" This model will draw on the works of
four geographers, Halford Mackinder, Johann Heinrich von Thunen, Yi-Fu Tuan,
and Walter Christaller. With the exception of Mackinder, these geographers did
not address issues of military geography or geo-strategy. However, their theories
and insights can be modified to create a model of defense. This model, while
developed in a Russian context, can easily be adapted as a model for other states.
The model contains two factors: the cost of defense and the propensity to
defend. The former accounts for the economic, political, and social costs
associated with the decision to defend a given territory. The propensity to defend
accounts for the motivations and national interests which lead a nation to want to
defend a given area. The propensity to defend is an extremely complex factor.
It is made up of various elements such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties to
the residents; historic ties to, and claims on, a particular territory; economic
interests; political ties; the desire for collective security; and the manner in which
national myths and psychology find their expression in claims over territory. When
these elements are treated separately and overlain on geographic space, it
becomes obvious that in many cases they make competing demands on the same
territory. This forms the basis for violent confrontation. Since these demands are
of different natures, it is necessary to understand their origins, their geographic
extent, and which policy actions may resolve the issues, and which will not.
The model will then be applied to Russia. The thesis will examine the way
these factors of the cost of defense and the propensity to defend are finding their
expression in the current debate of military doctrine. It will then adopt a regional
approach and examine three regions in detail, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and
Ukraine. The thesis concludes with some implications for U.S. policy.
II. THE REDISCOVERY OF SVECHIN
During the Gorbachev years, profound changes swept the political and
economic thinking of the Soviet Union. The terms glasnosf and perestroika
entered the lexicon of even Western nations. As part of this "new thinking," the
role of the armed forces was undergoing the most significant examination in forty
years. Terms like "defensive sufficiency" began to be discussed in Soviet military
thinking.
Coincident with this discussion, a curious citation appeared in an article by
Dr. Andrei Kokoshin and Prof. Valentin Larionov (1987). The significance of a
citation by authors of such prominence could not be ignored. Kokoshin was then
the Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and is today the First
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation; Larionov is a retired
General-Major, a primary author of Sokolovskii's Military Strategy (1963), and is
one of the most prominent Russian strategic thinkers in his own right. The citation
was of the work of a largely forgotten Russian military strategist, Professor
Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin. From this oblique reference to the work of
Svechin, interest has steadily grown in both the Russian language press, and in
the West. Kokoshin wrote a full-length article on Svechin and his thought (1988),
and was joined for a second article by none other than General V. N. Lobov, who
became Chief of the General Staff (1990). Kokoshin and Larionov co-wrote an
article on military doctrine for Kommunist (1990) in which Svechin and his
approach were featured prominently. Other articles in the Russian press (Geller;
Gaydukov) have made specific reference to the value of Svechin to his own time,
as well as to the present.
The attention being paid to Svechin has not been limited to the Soviet Union
and its successor states. The circle of readers interested in Svechin was widened
with the publication of an English translation of the second edition of the magnum
opus of Svechin, Strategy (1992). This latter work contains new essays by
Kokoshin and Larionov (1992), Lobov (1992), and Dr. Jacob W. Kipp of the U.S.
Army's Foreign Military Studies Office (1992). On a research trip to Russia and
Ukraine in the summer of 1 992, the author noted this English language translation
on the shelves in the offices of several senior military officers and national security
analysts. A copy of the translation may be easier to obtain in Russia than an
original edition. The sudden interest has sparked further analyses of Svechin's
work (Stoeker; Waters; Blank). Who was this figure who had languished so long
in relative obscurity? Why was his work significant? Do these ideas apply today?
A. BIOGRAPHY OF SVECHIN
Svechin was born in Yekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk) in August 1878. His
father was the Chief of Staff of the 34th Infantry Division. Aleksandr and his older
brother Mikhail were tutored privately, and then sent to military school. Aleksandr
graduated from the Mikhailovsk Artillery School in 1897 and from the Nikolaevsk
Academy of the General Staff in 1903. He became a company commander and
then a staff officer of the 16th Army Corps of the 3rd Manchurian Army taking part
in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Following the war, he began a study of
the conduct of the Russo-Japanese war and of Russian military thought in general,
which resulted in numerous articles and monographs. For a time during 1913, he
was stationed in France.
With the outbreak of the First World War, he was sent to the German
-
Russian front. Later, he was an officer of the Chief of Staff of the Russian High
Command. From July 1915 to January 1917 he commanded the 6th Finnish Rifle
Regiment. In July 1917 he became the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army, and in
September, the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front. Of this period, his official
biography simply says that Aleksandr Svechin subsequently "was demobilized with
the rank of General-Major." (Ageev, p. 126)
At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Aleksandr's brother Mikhail was the
commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps on the Northern Front with rank of General-
Lieutenant. Mikhail was embittered with the performance of the Provisional
Government, and following the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, fearing things
were going to become even worse, he resolved to take action. Mikhail received
approval from his new semi-literate Bolshevik commissar, Seaman Second-class
Simachev to be "sent on vacation" for two months. He took his leave papers and
headed south to the Don, where had heard that a "volunteer army" was forming.
Curiously, Mikhail never mentioned in his memoirs whether he had been in
communication, or received help from, his brother Aleksandr at the Front
headquarters. Mikhail subsequently served the White armies as an emissary to
the Ukrainian Hetmanate until being forced to flee Russia forever (Svechin, M. A.,
1964).
Aleksandr Svechin remained in Russia and joined the Red Army in March
1918. He served as a Military Commissar in the Smolensk region, and from
August 1918 he worked for the Chief of the All-Russian Main Staff (Ageev, p. 126).
In October (Geller) or November (Ageev) of 1918 he became a professor at the
Academy of the General Staff, which from 1921 on was known as the Military
Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). He was in charge of
a commission to study the lessons of the First World War.
This study ushered in the most fruitful period in the life of Svechin. He wrote
a three-volume study Istoriia Voennogo Iskusstva (History of Military Art, 1922,
1923) in which he followed the intellectual lead of the German historian and
military theorist Hans Delbruck. The first edition of Strategy (1926) was followed
by a second (1927). He expanded his earlier three volume work and it was
published as Evoliutsiia Voennogo Iskusstva (Evolution of Military Art, 1927, 1928).
During this time he also translated works of Ludendorf (1923, 1924), Von
Schlieffen (1923), and Clausewitz (1924). This does not include additional dozens
of articles.
This period of the flowering of Svechin's thought coincided with the New
Economic Policy and the years immediately following. But the steady flow from
Svechin's pen was cut short. From 1930 to 1934 Svechin published nothing. The
official Soviet biographies of Svechin give no explanation, nor does any English
language source.
Svechin was apparently in jail:
The fate of Aleksandr Andreevich took shape, as is usual with us, sadly. In
1930 he was arrested. However, knowledge and talent were still required,
and in 1933 he was set free. Moreover, maintaining his official category, he
was assigned to the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
(GRU). In 1935 he received the general's military rank of komdiv. Knowing
about the colossal achievements of Svechin in the creation of the Armed
Forces of the country, Stalin and Voroshilov, in mockery, gave to the
recalcitrant military leader, the rank won by him on the fields of battle twenty
years previously. In 1936 Svechin resumed the teaching work begun
eighteen years previously at the Academy of the General Staff of the RKKA.
(Geller, 1991, p. 10) (translated by the author)
It is not known what the charge against Svechin was, nor under what conditions
he was held. During this period, Svechin and his professional ideas were
denounced. Tukhachevskii wrote "Against Reactionary Theories on the Military-
Scientific Front (A Critique of the Military-Historical Views of Prof. Svechin)" (1931).
Tukhachevskii's book of the same title was published in 1931. The number of
copies printed of this denunciation (10,000), was double that of the second edition
of Strategy. Another article, "The Problem of Wars and the Vain Dialectical
Attempts of Prof Svechin," appeared in Bolshevik (Bukhartsev, 1931).
Svechin resumed writing following his release. First, a few of his articles
appeared in this era, and his significant book on Clausewitz (1935). As part of
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Stalin's purge of the Red Army, Svechin was removed from the army, and on 26
February 1938, he was again arrested, this time without reprieve.
B. SVECHIN'S THOUGHT
What makes Svechin's thought significant? How is it being utilized today in
Russia? What can Westerners learn from Svechin? First, Svechin was committed
to an objective analysis of facts. He courageously ignored pressure to conform
analysis to ideology. Second, he was an ardent student of military history. This
study led him to conclude that there were two ideal types of war: those pursuing
a victory through destruction, and those pursuing a victory through attrition.
Thirdly, he concluded that the modern theater of military operations was more
complex than previously seen, and it required a new type of thinking to manage.
His term, "operational art" refers to this management.
1 . Svechin's Objectivity
Svechin was not dogmatic. His Commission for the Study of the First
World War made a sincere attempt to analyze the facts of the conduct of the war,
unclouded by ideology.
At the same time Svechin promised an objectivity which transcended even
that of Moltke the Elder's injunction to his General Staff in writing up the
history of the Franco-Prussian War: "The truth, only the truth, but not all the
truth." Instead, Svechin said the Commission's motto would be Clausewitz's:
"The truth, only the truth, the whole truth." (Kipp, 1992, p. 33)
In one sense this was made easier because many of the czarist officers who had
held command position in the First World War were not in the Red Army, and the
revolutionary government could blame most deficiencies on them. However, it was
harder to maintain objectivity under a regime like the Bolshevik's which was so
ideologically oriented. Marxism-Leninism was essentially applied deductively, that
is, from a general theory toward particular applications of the theory, from dogma
to practice, from the Party hierarchy down to the local activist. This does not lend
itself to objectivity. Inconvenient facts that do not fit the theory are ignored or
explained away. The refusal to compromise his principles would create increasing
troubles for Svechin with the authorities. Tukhachevskii's military thought was
more in line with Lenin's theory, and Stalin's temperament, and in the politically
charged atmosphere of the day ideology won out over scholarship and objective
thinking.
Svechin was not a Communist Party member, nor was he a Marxist.
This fact alone is remarkable: that a Bolshevik government would entrust the
instruction of strategy at its most important military academy to a non-Marxist.
Svechin's writings do not contain the slavish references to Marx and Lenin which
characterize much of later military thought. This makes them more palatable in
Russia today: the ideological gilding does not have to be stripped away. Svechin
remains largely uncontaminated by Marxist theory, and he therefore is acceptable
to a wide spectrum of political thought, from neo-imperialist nationalists to liberals.
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Not only did Svechin reject ideological cant, he also insisted on an
openness of thought. His choice of words in the title The Evolution of Military
Thought is no accident. The art of war constantly changes, and therefore to rely
on school solutions would only lead a nation to prepare for the last war (Svechin
1992, p, 61). Chief among the causes for this evolution in the art of war is
technological change. The importance of railroads, communications, aviation, and
new weapons significantly change the military-technical aspects of war, and
therefore the appropriate military art to be applied (Svechin, 1927-1928, vol. II, pp.
537-567).
2. The Role of History
Svechin was primarily a student of military history. He saw history as
the basis for any strategic enterprise. Only by grounding himself in historical
research, and drawing upon the lessons of history, could a military leader hope to
understand strategy.
Issues of military history are particularly pertinent to persons involved in the
study of strategy, because by its very methods strategy is merely a
systematic contemplation of military history. (Svechin, 1992, p. 77)
The works The History of Military Art and The Evolution of Military Art
were the first comprehensive works on military history to appear in Russian. Aside
from adapting Delbruck's broadly historical approach, Svechin also accepted his
classification of wars into two types. Svechin called Delbruck's
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Niederwerfungsstrategie as a strategy of sokrushenie (destruction). Delbruck's
Ermattungsstrategie became Svechin's izmor (attrition, or literally, "starvation").
What do these two ideal categories of victory through destruction and
victory through attrition mean? A war of destruction is preferably fought on the
strategic offensive, while a war of attrition makes use the strategic defensive, at
least during the early phases of a war. Because a strategy of destruction relies
on the offensive it assumes maximum intensity at the beginning of hostilities. To
achieve this, it must rely on large standing forces and stockpiled materiel. A
strategy of attrition, in contrast, does not achieve its maximum intensity until
several months, or even years, after the initiation of hostilities. It relies on small
covering operations to avoid having its forces overrun while the population and
industry are mobilized. As the name implies, a strategy of destruction requires the
total destruction of the enemy, while a strategy of attrition may, although not
always, be mandated by political goals and objectives which are more modest
(Svechin, 1992, p. 97).
Svechin thought both forms of strategy were viable, but the most
appropriate form should be dictated by the particular political and economic factors
at play in a given conflict.
When a state is poorly prepared for land war (Great Britain, the United
States), its peak of strategic intensity obviously could not coincide with the
first weeks of the war but would rather be postponed one, two, or three
years. States which have weak armies in peacetime wage long wars.
Shifting the center of gravity to mobilizing military industry leads to the same
situation (Svechin, 1992, p. 98).
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Svechin also identified strong geographic factors as favoring victory through one
strategy or the other.
(T)he distance between two states which may enter into conflict only in a
remote theater of war separated by seas or distance from the most important
centers of the hostile states (Japan and Russia) would obviously prevent a
war of destruction. Military parity also leads to the renunciation of a
destructive strike. Military preparations made for the purpose of maximizing
strategic intensity as quickly as possible and extensive land boundaries
crossed by good lines of communication, a significant superiority in forces
and a hostile state whose political structure resembles a giant with feet of
clay are conditions which favor a destructive strike (Svechin, 1992, p. 98).
He concludes that these factors favored long wars of attrition, especially for
Moscow.
His thought directly challenged the "young Turks" at the academy, who,
fresh from their Civil War experience, saw a war of destruction against the
capitalist states as fulfilling the historical destiny of Marxism-Leninism. Svechin's
position was further compromised with the launching of the First Five-Year Plan.
Not only did this coincide with the beginning of the political purges, but the rapid
industrialization program would, it was thought, produce enough material in a crash
program to allow a war of destruction. To oppose a strategy of destruction carried
the implied criticism of the economic program of the nation, which was launched
to allow the strategy of destruction to be followed. Svechin unguardedly criticized
this economic program.
Operational art lost touch with its material basis, and this inflicted double
damage. The strategy of the Russian army received a sharply scholastic
13
coloring, but fundamental questions of the rear had the possibility to develop
only spontaneously, without the influence of any rational ideas. The theory
gives full freedom to the suppliers and the "redskins;" the result is that the
theater of military operations turns out to be organized without a well thought
out plan, like our type of disorderly domestic economy of gigantic measures.
(Svechin, 1928, p. 96) (translated by the author)
A strategy of destruction is more expensive to pursue than a strategy
of attrition. Large armies and stocks are maintained during peacetime. Not only
this, but by preparing for a war of destruction, a state may also make itself
vulnerable. The industry is not oriented to begin large-scale production of war-
goods. Interior lines of communication are not maintained, since the war is
planned to be fought on opposing territory, and is intended to be over quickly.
Industries are located in the vulnerable periphery, as are the armies themselves,
and these then become vulnerable to enveloping operations.
[Svechin] considered that it was necessary to prepare most seriously for a
long period of defensive actions and correspondingly prepare rear defensive
lines. Svechin cautioned against placing all new large industrial objectives
in the vicinity of the USSR's western border, considering that they could be
lost as a result of defensive engagements in the initial period of war. In this
connection he came out against "superconcentration" of industry and
population in Leningrad, calling this 'the Sevastopol of a future war.'"
(Kokoshin and Larionov, 1992, p. 10)
For Svechin, the error of a nation preparing for a victory through destruction only
to be forced to later adopt a strategy of attrition was one which had been repeated
throughout history.
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By the end of the thirties, the debate over the appropriate strategic
posture had been won by those, like Tukhachevskii, who favored a war of
destruction. However, the initial period of the war found the Soviet Union unable
to pursue victory through destruction, and unprepared for a war of attrition.
By that time, however, Svechin was dead, a victim, along with his rival, M.
N. Tukhachevskii, of Stalin's blood purge of the Soviet military.
Tukhachevskii did not live to see the fate of his mass mechanized army
during the initial period of war, when it was all but annihilated. Following
those initial defeats, another Soviet army, as was befitting Svechin's "second
act," arose. This people's army lost battle after battle, was surrounded,
smashed, and phoenix-like arose from its own ashes to confound the
architects of blitzkrieg. With its blood, the blood of millions, it bought time for
a new generation of military leaders to master operational art and for the
nation to forge the new weapons of war. This was the army of attrition, the
army of izmor, the army of people's war, the army of Russia, the army of
Svechin. Moscow and Stalingrad were its victories. (Kipp, 1992, p. 55)
3. The Development of Operational Art
The third contribution of Aleksandr Svechin was the development of
"operational art," a term he first coined. This term refers to the level of military art
between strategy and tactics. As such, the form of operational art employed in a
given conflict is derived from the strategy and finds its expression in the tactics.
It ties together tactical engagements in a logical manner to support strategic
victory. Svechin developed his ideas about operational art by drawing upon his
experiences in the Russo-Japanese War. In that war, large armies met on a
theater whose breadth and depth exceeded those previously faced by Russian
commanders. The complexity of the new theater required a new thinking about
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how to manage forces, space, and time, to achieve victory. This was a type of
military thinking for which the Russian commanders were unprepared. He defined
an operation as "an act of war if the efforts of troops are directed toward the
achievement of a certain intermediate goal in a certain theater of military
operations without any interruptions" (Svechin, 1992, p. 69).
Svechin drew a distinction between strategy and operational art.
Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of
operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed forces.
Strategy decides issues associated with the employment of the armed forces
and all the resources of a country for achieving ultimate war aims. While
operational art must take into account the possibilities presented by the
immediate rear (front logistics), the strategist must take into account the
entire rear, both his own and the enemy's, represented by the state with all
its economic and political capabilities. A strategist will be successful if he
correctly evaluates the nature of a war, which depends on different economic,
social, geographic, administrative and technical factors. (Svechin, 1992, p.
69)
The geographic extent of operational art therefore is that of the theater of military
operations. It can also exist for a particular service. For example, one may speak
of a naval operational art or an air force operational art, but only if the service is
given separate operational goals. Strategy, on the other hand, is necessarily a
combined arms concept and may function beyond the geographic extent of the
theater. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of an "air force strategy," but only
of an air force operational art (Svechin, 1992, p. 70).
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C. IMPORTANCE OF SVECHIN TODAY
What is the importance of Svechin today, and why have his works undergone
such a renaissance? The reasons follow the content of Svechin's thought.
First, the undogmatic nature of Svechin's thought finds a resonant chord in
the current Russian debates about military policy and strategy. The example of
Svechin who boldly spoke the truth as he saw it in spite of the consequences has
given inspiration to a new generation of strategic thinkers. Svechin saw a strategy
of destruction as costly to the national economy. His assertions about the viability,
and even of advisability of a strategy of attrition as both less costly and still
providing for adequate security are very similar to the position of many reform-
minded thinkers in Russia today such as Kokoshin and Larionov.
Second, Svechin's historical approach gives additional weight to his prediction
in the 1920's and 1930's. The Soviet Union began with a strategy of victory
through destruction, but as Kipp so eloquently said, it was only through "the blood
of millions" (p. 55) and the shifting to a strategy of attrition that the Soviet Union
was able to achieve victory in World War Two. Quite simply, the history of that
war validates Svechin and his thought. At the same time, Svechin warned against
any rigidity of thought. He specifically identified the role of changes in the military-
technical realm which will necessitate changes in military art, and even in strategic
thinking. Svechin can therefore be used by those who argue that a major change
in technology has occurred, and that strategic and operational thinking has not
kept pace.
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Thirdly, Svechin is important because of his thinking on operational art. The
concept, and the term itself, have certainly been re-validated by military experience
from the First World War through the Gulf War. It is the ability to tie together
numerous engagements across a wide geographic area that has been the
difference between victory and defeat. The trend, in fact, has been for the theater
to become more complex, and the task of managing assets has become more
difficult over time.
For Svechin, the management of assets required a secure rear area. This
was especially true when following a strategy of victory through attrition. Forces
must be mobilized, and this can only take place in a secure geographic rear.
Svechin identified two rear areas: the "front" rear which served the operational
needs of the theater, and the "state" rear, which served strategic needs. Svechin
insisted that as strategy is superior to operations, the needs of the state rear must
take precedence over the front rear (Svechin, 1928).
Operational art, as Svechin understood it, requires the development of a
theater of military operations. It is imperative that a state determine the nature of
the military threat, the location of a likely theater of military operations, and how
a future war will be conducted. Then, and only then, can a theater be prepared.
This preparation is necessary regardless of the strategic paradigm employed. This
takes on a critical nature when the potential theater is underdeveloped
{malokul'turniy). Without the establishment of proper logistics lines, bases,
communications links, without adequate reconnaissance and mapping, engineering
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surveys and construction, the war can only be conducted successfully at enormous
additional costs. A small investment before war yields much greater savings when
the battle is joined.
Each country may be a base only in the existence of well-known
prerequisites--of the development of a theater of war, of the existence of
local means, of the sufficient development of the railroad network. In an
underdeveloped theater, the thesis of a state rear is naturally no longer
relevant. The characteristic features of the conduct of war in an
underdeveloped theater are enormous overhead costs~for the establishment
of a vast basis for the conduct of operations, in building necessary roads, in
the building of storehouses, of rear towns, of strong points, in the
concentration of vast supplies, even in the building of forest paths and the
draining of swamps; only by enormous additional efforts to surmount the
underdevelopment does a theater of military operations adjust to the
conditions of the operations of European forces, the center of gravity of the
operations shifts to preparatory and administrative work, and only then uses
the superiority of European equipment and training of forces. (Svechin,
1928, p. 98) (translation by the author)
In the discussions of Svechin, the relationship between operational art and
the preparation of a theater of war is one which has received too little attention.
This thesis is a attempt to draw attention to this aspect of Svechin's thought.
The necessity to prepare the theater and determine the appropriate strategic
paradigm is acutely felt in Russia today. For four decades following the Second
World War, these question had clear answers. The strategic axis ran east-west
across Central Europe, and the Red Army would pursue a strategy of destruction.
Elaborate preparations were made in stationing Soviet forces on the territory of the
Warsaw Pact. These nations' armies became fully integrated with the Red Army,
rates of advance were calculated, and logistics lines and bases were established
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to support this rate of advance. Equipment and training requirements were
determined by the operational concept.
As Stalin's and Tukhachevskii's army, oriented for a war of destruction, was
destroyed by the Wehrmacht blitzkrieg in the early days of the Second World War,
the political changes of 1989-1 991 have done almost as much harm to the fighting
ability of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union. The dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact meant that logistics bases, and lines of communication, thoroughly
prepared for an echeloned offense, were now on neutral, and potentially hostile,
territory. The Soviet Groups of Forces in Germany, the cream of the Red Army,
suddenly found itself on NATO territory without ever leaving the confines of the
garrison. This force could not hope for re-supply or re-enforcement, and therefore
was rendered inert.
This situation was exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
.
The military districts which had been in the deep rear, and organized for the
purpose of mobilizing forces, suddenly found themselves bordering on newly
sovereign states. This area, once in the rear, and now potentially on the front,
must be considered to be an underdeveloped theater of military operations. The
requirements set forth by Svechin to develop this zone therefore apply. Russia in
1 993 finds itself in a situation analogous to the Soviet Union of 1 941 . It is unable
to conduct a strategy of destruction, and it is unprepared for a strategy of attrition.
Just as operations are subordinate to strategy, and strategy subordinate to
politics, the development of the theater will have to await the determination of what
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Moscow will consider to be its "defensive space," that is, what Moscow will defend.
This is the central question of this thesis. It is only when politics has determined
what Moscow will defend will the military be able to begin the development of the
theater, and organize, equip, and train its forces to defend the Russian
Motherland.
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III. WHAT MOSCOW WILL DEFEND
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This chapter will be addressing the problem, "What will Moscow defend?" It
will be assumed from the outset that Moscow is primarily interested in the defense
of Russia. However, it would be too simplistic to draw a line coincident with the
boundaries of the current Russian Federation, and proclaim that this is where
Russia will define its security frontier. It is necessary to account for the bi-lateral
and multi-lateral security arrangements with other republics, for example, with the
Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, which Russia may feel obliged
to uphold. But extending the outer boundary to include those states which have
a formal security arrangement with Moscow is also too simplistic. The issue would
be a very complex one for any state, and due to the current political flux, this is
doubly so today in Russia. Therefore, one must not be doctrinaire in analyzing
how Russia will define its security frontier. I want to examine the problem in a
deeper, more lasting way, rather than drawing a line on a map. To do so would
be to risk having the entire problem swept aside with the morning papers. Aspects
of defense policy may change with the government, but the factors which drive the
problem should continue in spite of policy perturbations.
When the discussion concerns other states, either within the structure of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or in some other security
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arrangement, the perspective will normally be from Moscow, rather than from,
Dushanbe or Tallinn. I will do this for three reasons. First, Russia holds a unique
geographic position at the core, with respect to the non-Russian republics lying
along the periphery. This will be important for the model. Second, Russia is by
far the largest republic, and has the greatest number of nuclear weapons, the bulk
of the navy, etc. Russia is the most important nation in her own right, and
therefore, what Moscow will defend is an important question in itself. Thirdly, in
some important ways, Russia functions as the successor to the Soviet Union. It
has been Russian and Soviet imperialism that has historically dominated the non-
Russian republics. Therefore, the historical, cultural, political, and economic ties
between many of the former Soviet states tend to be weaker than their relationship
with Russia. The links, both logical and logistical, between Dushanbe and Kiev
tend to run via Moscow. It is difficult to imagine a defense alliance between, say,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, that did not include Russian participation. The republics
would be physically isolated from each other, making a workable alliance virtually
impossible. Russia has a long history as a major international actor. It can be
expected to make an attempt to continue this role, as much as internal politics and
economics allow. So the Russian perspective is most important because it holds
the geographic center, it is the most powerful in itself, as well as having the most
important ties with the peripheral republics and important international relations.
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Moscow may be defending something other than the outer borders of the
Russian Federation, as currently constituted. This may include the defense of the
outer borders of the former Soviet peripheral states against external enemies. It
may include internal security operations within those republics against threats to
domestic peace and security. This takes on an added dimension when one
considers that ethnonationalism and domestic politics in Russia may fuel
revanchism for the "near abroad" (i.e. former Soviet republics). Intervention may
be rationalized on the premise of protecting the human rights of Russians in those
republics. In the long-term at least, we should include the possibility that the
Russian definition of territory that will be defended may include areas, such as
Afghanistan in 1979, which fell outside the borders of the Soviet Union.
There are two purposes to the following sections. The first is to acquaint the
reader to a few classic geographic models. This should serve to show how the
author's model fits into the body of geographic theories. The second is to build,
step by step, the model itself. In doing so, I will be drawing upon these same
classic models, in effect, altering their context for application to a model of
defense.
B. MACKINDER
The most obvious example in the history of geography of a model relating to
Russia and defense is the "Heartland" theory of the Scottish geographer Halford
Mackinder (1861-1947). This model was first developed in a lecture before the
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Royal Geographic Society, "The Geographic Pivot of History" (Mackinder, 1904).
In this lecture he discussed his proposition that the "pivot" of history was the
control of an area in central Eurasia. In later discussions he changed the awkward
term of "pivot" to the "Heartland" (Mackinder, 1919).
His thesis was that this "pivot" area or "Heartland" had exerted controlling
influence for many centuries upon the rest of the Eurasian land mass. The period
of this controlling influence had been interrupted by the "Columbian Epoch." By
this he meant that period from the 15th century until his time. During the
Columbian Epoch, the primacy of Europe had been based on a mercantile
exploitation of the Americas and Asia. This exploitation had been made possible
due to the improvements in navigation and ship-building. This change in
technology made long-range sea travel easier, and therefore, favored sea lanes
of communication at the expense of overland commerce. However, Mackinder
claimed that the age of this primacy of naval power was coming to a close. The
new age would not be based on sea power. The "World-Island" (Eurasia plus
Africa) would once again resume its natural role and be the focus of economic and
political activity. The control of the "Heartland" of this land mass would control the
whole of this "World-Island" and therefore, ultimately, the entire world.
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-
Island commands the world. (Mackinder, 1919, p. 186)
In essence, he was arguing for the primacy of land power in geo-strategy.
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Mackinder identified the changing technology as key in determining the geo-
strategic equation. The new technological change, for Mackinder, was the
development of rail links in Central Eurasia. Eurasia would be able to overcome
the vast distances necessary to link east and west, north and south. While the
area had been relatively disadvantaged for internal and external commerce in the
era of water transport, the development of rail links favored a land power. The
timing of his theory in 1904 is coincident with the completion of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad, and the challenge to Japanese power which resulted in the attack on
Port Arthur and the Russo-Japanese War.
Aside from the linking of east and west, the new railroads would allow the
exploitation of the vast mineral and timber resources of Central Asia and Siberia.
It is interesting to compare the world-wide rail links envisioned by Mackinder with
those that have been actually constructed. Although not all of the railroads in
Africa and Asia that he predicted were ever completed, his predictions for those
in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and China are remarkably accurate (Hauner,
1990, pp. 142-3).
For Mackinder, another factor favoring the Heartland was the particular
geographic features of topography of the Heartland itself. Among these are the
drainage patterns of Russia. Major rivers such as the Yenesei, Ob', and Lena flow
northward, greatly reducing their utility for navigation. In the United States, by
contrast, the mouth and entire lower reaches of the Mississippi remain open year-
round, even when the source in Minnesota is frozen. Other major Russian rivers
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such as the Volga have no outlet to the ocean at all. Other geographic features
such as the mountains to the south, and the arctic cold to the north, decreased the
relative vulnerability of the Heartland from challenges from the periphery.
It is also interesting to note that Mackinder's theory received virtually no
comment by the tsarist government or scholars, or even later by the Soviets
(Hauner, 1990, pp. 147-9). We might speculate what the reasons could be for
this. Mackinder, as a Briton, was warning the rest of the world of the potential
threat of domination by Russia. It was not in the interests of either Russia or the
Soviet Union to underscore this geographic advantage. It was in their interests to
quietly exploit this advantage without provoking a response.
Mackinder asserted that it was not necessary to occupy the Heartland, only
to control it. This could be accomplished from Moscow, Berlin, or Tokyo. He saw
the struggle for control of the Heartland as having been largely one of Russo-
German competition. In light of this, he modified his definition of the boundaries
of the Heartland twice. Following the First World War, he expanded the
boundaries. This increased the relative importance of Central Europe. This had
been the main theater of war, and international boundaries had recently been re-
drawn. To a lesser extent it also emphasized the role of China (Figure 1). During
the midst of World War Two, he withdrew the eastern boundary. Perhaps
unconsciously, this had the effect of minimizing the impact of Japanese occupation
of Manchuria and the Pacific Theater as a whole, while emphasizing the geo-
strategic importance of the European Theater (Hauner, 1990, p. 138).
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Figure 1 The Changing Boundaries of Mackinder's Heartland
Source: (Hauner, 1990, p. 138)
The Mackinder thesis was, in large part, a critique of the naval theories of
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan, of course, argued forcefully for the decisive role of
naval forces in determining the relative strength of nations. In Mahan's view, a
control of the sea (and a few critical coaling stations) allowed a nation to control
the coastlands. Control of the coasts might then allow a nation to control interior
territory, such as Mackinder's Heartland. However, even Mahan recognized the
natural advantages of defense from attack from the sea that Russia enjoyed. The
remote interior lines of communication in Russia protected it, "for the Russian
center cannot be broken" (Mahan, 1900, p. 27).
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Later Nicholas Spykman (1944) argued that the critical territory was the
"rimlands" (that area of the periphery of Eurasia that Mackinder had called the
"interior crescent"). Control of the periphery would ensure control of the Heartland,
agreeing largely with Mahan.
My purpose is not to try to determine who was "right" in this debate. It is
better to think of the writers as complementary. All identified Heartlands, rimlands,
and ocean territories, although their terms for these varied. These would be the
stages upon which the national actors would play their geo-strategic roles. For
Mahan, it is the projection of power from the sea onto the coastlands, and
eventually into the geographic core. For Mackinder, the projection of power was
from the core to the periphery. Both Mahan and Mackinder identified naval power
as playing a key role in national dominance, at least during a certain historical
period.
So what is the value of Mackinder? Mackinder argued that the value of a
certain part of Central Eurasia had dramatically increased due to a technological
change, the maturation of the railroad as a means of commerce. He did correctly
foresee that the influence of Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, would
greatly increase. Certainly Mackinder was too deterministic. The Soviet Union
never controlled the world. Perhaps this was in part due to subsequent
technological developments such as the wide use of air transport, the invention of
radio telecommunication, etc. These have all tended to reduce the importance of
railroads as land links.
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A second lesson from Mackinder is the importance of core-periphery
relations, and the essential role of maintaining control of the interior lines of
communication. Aside from the Central Eurasian issue, he cited the importance
of control of the Mediterranean for the Greeks and the Roman Empire. He also
discussed the necessity of control of the desert oases for the Babylonian, Syrian,
and Egyptian empires (Mackinder, 1904, pp. 430-2). It is the requirement of
maintaining a central geographic core with secure interior lines that is the sine qua
non which permits the centrifugal expansion of power. The value of linking east
and west, and having an interior heartland from which to draw reserves was
dramatically borne out for the Soviet Union during the Second World War. These
are the enduring legacies of Mackinder.
My model of what Moscow will defend is one which deals with the core-
periphery issue that interested Mackinder. It depends on two issues. The first is
the ability of Moscow to control a core territory. The second is whether Russia will
be able to advance forces beyond this core to the periphery.
C. VON THUNEN
A second classic geographic model is that of Johann Heinrich von Thiinen
(1783-1850), which was published as Der Isolierte Staat in 1826 (von Thiinen,
1966). This model attempts to explain the geographic differentiation of economic
activity, even when there are no differences in topography, soils, climate, etc. He
described how agricultural specialization would occur in the zone around an
30
isolated market center. Once again, this was an issue of a center, surrounded by
a peripheral, or tributary, area.
Von Thiinen made several assumptions in his model:
1. There is a single urban market located on a plain with uniform
characteristics of topography, climate, soil, etc., and that the market and the
hinterland are solely dependent upon each other.
2. The economic system is free and competitive with each farmer trying to
maximize personal profits.
3. For each agricultural commodity, all land is equal in terms of on-site
production and productivity.
4. There is one mode of transportation through the plain, the ox cart.
The determining factor for land use differentiation in the hinterlands is the
difference in the cost required to send each commodity to market. This, in turn,
determines the rent on land in each zone, and which commodity is produced there.
Von Thunen concluded that there would emerge a system of six concentric
zones around the market center.
1
.
Horticulture and milk production
2. Silviculture
3. Intensive arable land
4. Crop rotation with fallow









Figure 2 Von Thunen's Model
Source: Kendall, and others, 1976, p. 503.
These zones would then be surrounded by a wilderness in which the costs of
bringing any commodity to market would exceed the value of that commodity at
the marketplace, Figure 2.
Like Mackinder, Von Thunen was interested in core-periphery questions. He
was interested in the theoretical expression of economic forces in a two-
dimensional geographic space. Due to its simplicity, his model remains a classic.
D. APPLICATION OF MACKINDER AND VON THUNEN
Can a geographic theory such as von Thunen's be adapted to explain what
a state will defend? There are similarities between this issue and the problem
which interested von Thunen. He observed a differentiation of land-use in two-
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dimensional space, and attempted to explain it. It is reasonable to assume that
there is an analogous differentiation of defense interests in two-dimensional space.
In von Thunen's model, the costs of transportation were the key to differentiation.
Let us look at the economic costs of sending a military expeditionary force
from the core to the periphery. Let us say this is the cost of moving an army
division of personnel, with its equipment, from its home base. As the distance
traversed increases, so does the amount of fuel used, and the size and complexity
of the logistics train. The cost is therefore positively correlated with the distance
from the base. This is an example of the costs of a dynamic military operation.
What are the economic costs of a static military operation? Let us look at the
example of an air defense net. Imagine the net is composed of a series of
surface-to-air missiles and associated radars located around the border of a
circular state. They are spaced in such a way that the outer edge of one battery
is tangent with the envelope of the adjoining battery, covering the entire frontier.
If we increase the size of the circle, the number of batteries must increase, in
direct proportion to the increase in the radius. This same principle would apply for
border troops, air defense interceptors, etc. Therefore, both for a static and a
dynamic defense, the economic costs will increase with a larger size defended,





Figure 3 Cost of Defense
E. TUAN
The theories of von Thiinen deal with the differentiation of geographic space
driven by market forces. However, it is quite clear that decision making with
respect to land occupancy, use, and defense, are not driven solely by economics.
This has been demonstrated in research dealing with perceptions of the
environment. One example is the settling of the North American continent. The
central grasslands, labeled as the Great American Desert, tended to be bypassed
in favor of Oregon. In the minds of the settlers, rich farmland was associated with
forested areas. The result was that the prairie schooners rolled over the rich
chernozem soil, and the interior tended to be settled relatively late (Bowden, 1976,
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pp. 119-147). This "environmental perception" factor exerted a strong influence
on behavior.
Environmental perception has been developed further in the writings of the
geographer Yi-Fu Tuan. He is not only interested in geographic behavior caused
by lack of accurate information as in the case above, but also in the cultural,
demographic, and psychological factors which cause this behavior. He is
especially interested in the ties that people feel to land. Professor Tuan has
coined the term topophilia to refer to "the affective bond between people and place
or setting" (Tuan, 1974, p.4). To understand this, he has argued for a humanistic
geography which takes its insights and methods from the humanities (Tuan, 1 976).
Recounting the work of another humanistic geographer who described this feeling
which transcends economics, he wrote:
When Saarinen, in his study on the Great Plains, showed some wheat
growers a picture of a farm besieged by wind and dust, their characteristic
response was that the dust-bowl farmer knows he can do better elsewhere,
but remains because he loves the soil and the challenge of making a go of
it. (Tuan, 1974, p. 96)
Tuan is interested in the maps that we all carry around inside our heads, our
psychological cartography. He is further interested in how this space is organized,
and what values we ascribe to the places in our mental maps, and why. This bond
affects what we see when we look at the world.
Our view of the world is influenced first by our common tools of perception,
the five senses. As primates, for example, we have the ability to discern color
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which is unmatched by other mammals, while our sense of smell is relatively
undeveloped. Other physiological effects, or the factors of age, sex, occupation,
etc., can be shown to affect our personal view of the world (Tuan, 1974, pp. 45-
74).
The aggregation of personal views toward land strongly influence culture and
group psychology. These cultural attitudes are then transmitted down through the
generations by means of art, literature, religion, myth, and symbol. As culture,
these attitudes can be studied, and their impact better understood.
One trait that appears to be nearly universal is the belief in the centrality and
importance of one's own territory. One example shows that eskimo men, when
asked to draw a map of their island, overestimate the size of the side of the island
on which they reside (Carpenter, 1955). Another surprising example is from
Mackinder. Two years prior to his "Heartland" article, he tried to show that
England lay in the center of the "land hemisphere" of the globe, as seen in Figure
4.
On a national level, these two ideas of centrality and the importance of home
territory constitute ethnocentrism.
Civilized cultures often have a highly developed cosmology, either secular or
religious. This cosmology segments space and reinforces ethnocentrism. The
classic example of this is the Mediterranean, whose very name denotes centrality.
The maps of medieval Europe showing the known world had common
characteristics which gave them name of "T-O" maps. The maps are "oriented,"
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:igure 4 Mackinder's View of the World
Source: Tuan, 1976, p. 43.
that is, with the east at the top. East was considered the most important cardinal
direction, as the place of the rising sun, and of the risen Christ: The "O" is formed
by the world ocean which surrounds the land mass. Within the O, the "T" is
formed. The downstroke of the T is the Mediterranean Sea, and the cross strokes
are the Nile and Don rivers. Jerusalem is at the juncture of the three bodies of
water, with Asia above the T, Africa to the right, and Europe to the left, asserting
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a geographic symmetry, and emphasizing the Mediterranean as the pathway to the
center of the world, see Figure 5 for a schematic form of these maps.
Figure 5 Schematic of a Medieval T-0 Map
Source: Tuan, 1976, p. 40.
A related idea is the concept of one's homeland as a middle zone lying
between lands and peoples who exhibit extreme characteristics. The history of this
idea of a middle zone goes back to antiquity. Within the Hellenist tradition,
physical locality was thought to determine the forms of political and economic
systems observed throughout the world. This was done either directly, or indirectly
through the effect of climate, soil, and water, which were thought to determine the
physiological health (generally through the balancing of humors) and the mental
development of various peoples (Glacken, 1967, pp. 80-115).
Virtually all the familiar assertions of modern times... are found in a cruder
form in antiquity; warm climates produce passionate natures; cold, bodily
strength and endurance; temperate climate intellectual superiority; and
38
among the non-physiological theories, a fertile soil produces soft people, a
barren one makes them brave (Glacken, 1967, p. 81).
Hippocrates expounds one early form of this theory, but it is also to be found
in Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and others, and even carried down, as Glacken noted,
to our day. This idea is not limited to the Western tradition. See Figure 6.
China did not see itself as a nation among other nations of comparable
stature. It stood at the center of the world; it was the Middle Kingdom. It
was even more grandly known as t'ien hsia (under heaven) or chung yuan
(center and source. . . . The idea of successive rectangular domains
centered on imperial China is traditional. The earliest expression of this idea
appears in the Shu Ching and possibly dates back to the fifth century B.C.
The earth was conceived as a succession of zones of decreasing culture
away from the imperial capital... This schema was popular with the Chinese
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Zone of cultureless savagery
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Figure 6 Traditional Chinese View of the World
Source: Tuan, 1976, p. 38.
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An obvious question is the extent to which Moscow leaders see themselves
as literally at the center of the world: at the juncture of Europe and Asia, between
the arctic wastes to the north, and the torrid, over-populated sub-continents to the
south. If that is the case, then there is a psychological and cosmological core, and
a periphery, and behavior depends in part on the structure of this cosmology.
But why this hatred against us? Why can't they all, once and for all, start
trusting us and become convinced of our harmlessness? Why can't they
believe that we are their friends and good servants, and that our whole
European mission is to serve Europe and her welfare?... Nay, they cannot
place trust in us. The main reason is that they are altogether unable to
recognize us as theirs.... In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves,
whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics,
whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. (Dostoyevsky, 1954, pp. 1046,
1048)
Establishing that a core-periphery attitude exists is not sufficient. One must
also have some sense for the question of scale. That is, how quickly in spatial
terms does the center fade into the border lands, the wilderness? The intensity
of emotion that an individual feels for place tends to operate on the personal scale.
One has the maximum intensity of feeling for the territory of one's domicile,
neighborhood, or city. This strong attachment to place can vary in scale and
intensity.
In ancient times it was a local sentiment. The Greeks did not apply
patriotism indiscriminately to all Greek-speaking lands, but to small fragments
such as Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and Smyrna. The Phoenicians were
patriotic to Tyre, Sidon, or Carthage; not to Phoenicia generally. The city
aroused profound emotions, especially when it came under attack. When the
Romans sought to punish the Carthaginian for disobedience by razing the
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city to the ground, citizens of Carthage begged their masters to spare the
physical city, its stones and temples, to which no possible guilt could be
attached, and instead, if necessary, exterminate the entire population. (Tuan,
1974, p. 100)
The converse process of ethnonationalism can be seen today in any number
of places, such as Bosnia. There, the physical destruction of villages and towns
which have been occupied for centuries by mixed ethnic groups is the price that
is gladly paid to force one of those groups, the muslims, to leave from territory the
Serbs (and Croats) view as inside their own legitimate boundaries. The ties may
be toward place, or ethnic group, or both.
The core-periphery is a useful image. It implies a radial differentiation of
space which echoes the structure of political boundaries. Political boundaries have
only two territories, the "inside" and the "outside." However, this may be
misleading in some instances. There are other ways to divide space, such as
cardinal directions: north, south, east and west. Are there other images or myths
which exist on the psychological level of the national elites of Russia?
A house is a structure whose physical boundaries are segmented. It has a
"front" and a "rear." The front is the carefully contrived facade that is presented
to the world. It is designed for the reception and entertaining of guests. The
central hearth area is the location of the kitchen and family activities. The "rear"
is space occupied by servants, tradesmen, etc. The front is sacred space, while
the rear is the realm of the profane, the garbage heap, the outhouse (Tuan, 1982,
pp. 52-85).
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A similar orientation can also apply to a city or even a nation.
The course of the Nile exerted a powerful influence on the Egyptian's sense
of direction. The word "to go north" meant also "to go downstream," and the
word "to go south" meant "to go upstream" or against the current. When the
Egyptian visited the Euphrates he would have had to describe its course in
some circumlocution as "that circling water which goes downstream in going
upstream." At the time the Egyptian language was forming, the direction
south dominated the Nile dweller's world. He faced south, the source of
rising flood waters and of life. The word for south was also that for face, and
the usual word for north was related to one which meant "back of the head."
Facing southward, east came to be identified with left, and west with right.
(Frankfort, et al., 1951, pp. 45-46)
The model can now be revisited. What has been added is that there is a
strong topophilic aspect to behavior that this is not based on rationality, but on
deeply held values which form a particular world view, and are expressed through
culture. The previous discussion was of the economic costs of defense. It tried
to show what a nation will be able to afford to defend. When considering ethnicity
or ties to a homeland, the equation must be one of what a nation such as Russia
will want to defend. This is not normally a matter of economics, but rather of
human values.
The obvious example of what Moscow will want to defend is ethnic Russians.
In order to bring the discussion to two dimensional geographic space, let us define
the "core" of ethnicity as the area where the population of ethnic Russians is
highest. The desire to defend the population would be highest there, at least when
considering only the factor of ethnicity. The interest in defending a territory in
which the percentage of ethnic Russians is low would similarly be low. Portrayed
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graphically, what might be termed the "propensity to defend" appears as a
negatively sloped line. The value placed on a given plot of land will be highest at
the core, and declines with increasing distance. Note that "distance" should not
be considered a strict linear distance, but rather to zones with decreasing density







Figure 7 Propensity to Defend
What other factors might be elements of the propensity to defend? Language
plays an important factor. While overlapping heavily with ethnicity, it should be
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considered a separate phenomenon due to the large number of Russified
minorities who have tended to drop their native culture in favor of Russian.
There is also a strong historic factor on human territoriality. The ties are
stronger to territory which has a long history of ties with Moscow, while the desire
will be weaker to defend territory over which the ties are not as long, or as strong.
The relative ease with which Moscow was willing to allow the Baltic republics
to withdraw from the Soviet Union and achieve their own independence is an
example of Moscow acknowledging that the legitimacy of their incorporation in the
Soviet Union was weaker than other republics.
Another element of the propensity to defend is of a very practical nature. It
is the desire to defend militarily significant regions. Here one should not only
consider the abstract regions, such as Mackinder's Heartland, but also smaller,
more specific territories, such as the Kola Peninsula. Loss of the Kola would be
devastating to Russia because of the loss of access to the open Atlantic, as well
as a loss of a large number of military bases. Should Karelia secede from the
Russian Federation, the land links to the Kola Peninsula would be lost. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost many valuable military bases. The
ones remaining, especially those of front-line forces, are therefore of increased
importance.
Economic interests, broadly defined, is an element in the propensity to
defend. Interest is high in valuable territory and low in wastelands. Oil was one
factor in the decision to launch Operation Desert Shield.
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A factor related to economic interest and military value is the desire to keep
the defensive zone contiguous. Today the Russian Federation includes the
exclave of the Kaliningrad Oblast on the Baltic Sea. This region has no direct land
connections with other areas of Russia. The ability to defend this isolated area,
and its economic viability are thereby threatened.
Another element is political status. There is a strong tendency to defend
political boundaries once they are defined. Clashes between India and Pakistan
over glaciers, and the recent firmness of Russian (and Japanese) policy toward the
southern Kuril Islands are two examples.
The concept of legal principle must be accounted for. By this I mean
designating space according to juridical claims. Two nations may disagree over
the legal claims to territory. They may also disagree over the principles
themselves which should apply in a specific case. Argentina saw its right to the
Malvinas as derived from historic land claims, while the United Kingdom saw the
appropriate principle to be the right of the residents of the Falklands for self-
determination. The result of the inability to agree on which principle to apply was
the Falklands War.
It should be acknowledged that the elements of the propensity to defend may
not always follow a smooth curve from the core to the periphery. Political status,
for example, changes quite sharply with respect to two-dimensional space because
political boundaries are sharply defined. For simplicity's sake, however, it can be
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assumed that when the factors are aggregated, the curve tends to smooth out, see
"d" in Figure 7.
If we superimpose the propensity to defend curve, d, on the defense cost
curve, s, we get equilibrium values for distance and cost (q and p, respectively),
see Figure 8.
Equi I i br i um Defense
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Figure 8 Defense Equilibrium
At a distance from the core beyond q, the desire to defend is overcome by
prohibitive costs, and therefore this territory will not be defended. At a distance
to the left of q, the value placed on the territory is high, and the costs to defend
it are low, and therefore the decision will be made to defend it.
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This is a good point to add other elements to the defense cost curve.
"Costs," like "values" may be interpreted broadly. These may be political costs,
rather than pure economic costs. Therefore, a military adventure away from the
homeland becomes more politically costly in the international community. The
domestic political cost may also be high. While George Bush received the political
benefits of a military victory in Desert Storm, he became vulnerable to the charge
of not attending to domestic problems, and subsequently lost the election.
Let us see how these curves could have functioned for Russia in the recent
past, to account for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the contraction of the
defensive borders, which precipitated the current dilemma of having no prepared
theater of military operations for Russia. There are two possible explanations for
this collapse. The first is that the defense build-up during the Reagan
administration forced the Soviet Union to increase defense spending. The second
theory is that the policy of the Communist Party changed under Gorbachev. The
Soviet Union implicitly rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine of keeping satellite nations
in the bloc, by force, if necessary.
If the first explanation is correct, this implies a change in the cost of defense
curve from s to s'. See Figure 9. That is, the costs of defending a given
geographic area rose. It should be noted here that costs may not be simple ruble
values, but percentages of Gross Domestic Product that must be allocated for
military spending. If the second explanation is correct, this implies a shift of the
propensity to defend curve from d to d'. See Figure 9. That is, an ideological shift
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Figure 9 Changes in Cost of Defense and Propensity to Defend
caused the desire to defend a given territory to be reduced.
Could similar shifts occur in the future? The answer is obviously, yes. For
example, if Yeltsin is politically defeated by factions which have the stated political
goals of defending ethnic Russians (or other Slavs) more aggressively, this will
indicate a shift of the propensity to defend curve, d, to the right.
The model of what Moscow will defend is still incomplete. The model has not
progressed beyond the basic von Thiinen paradigm. Von Thiinen described a
single market in isolation. To this point defense has been treated as if also existed
in isolation. However, military force is always used against something else. We
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must add additional actors to the model, and for this it will be necessary to turn to
the work of another geographer.
F. CHRISTALLER
Von Thiinen's work was with an isolated state. Only island states exist in
some form of isolation. To account for the existence of other actors, it will be
helpful to turn briefly to a related model known as central-place theory. Its most
important theorist was Walther Christaller, who wrote The Central Places of
Southern GermanyIn 1933 (Christaller, 1966). He examined spatial differentiation
when markets were in proximity to each other. In the region between the two
market centers, goods may be shipped to either market, or "central place," and the
residents of the hinterland can receive finished goods such as processed food,
clothing, education, medical care, etc., from either central place. However, the
most economic means is to supply raw materials and food to, and receive finished
products from, the closest center which handles that good. Christaller theorized
that the circular pattern would be replaced by a hexagonal pattern of evenly
distributed economic zones. This would most efficiently exhaust all the geographic
territory. These economic zones are known as the "tributary areas" of the central
places located at their centers. See Figure 10.
Christaller went beyond a simple pattern of equally sized and spaced
hexagons. The tributary area for each particular good will be of a different size.
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Figure 10 Tributary Areas of Central Places
Source: de Blij, 1971, p. 82.
doctor when they have a cold, it will be quite small, generally within the local area,
but general practitioners are common, and can generally be found even in small
towns. So the "tributary area" for general practitioners is small. Their services are
therefore called "low-order" goods. In contrast, the services of a brain surgeon are
rare and people will travel a great distance for them. The large tributary area for
a brain surgeon shows that it is a "high-order" good. So for each good or service,
the tributary area is of a differing size. "Low-order" goods have a short range,
while "higher-order" goods have a longer range. When these goods are
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aggregated, this leads to a system of central places of different sizes. Small
central places offer only low-order goods, such as the services of a general
practitioner, groceries, gasoline, etc. and have small tributary areas. Medium
central places offer all the "low-order" goods of small central places as well as
"medium-order" goods such as wholesalers, specialized stores, etc. Large central
places offer all of the goods of small and medium central places, and also have
"high-order" goods such as brain surgeons, large manufacturing plants, symphony
orchestras, etc. When these central places are overlain upon each other, this
leads to a hierarchical pattern of hexagons within other hexagons; see Figure 1 1
.
What might happen to the defense model by applying Christaller? First, each
one of the elements in the propensity to defend (ethnicity, language, historic ties,
political ties, etc.) should be treated as if it had a different "tributary area." Then
it is necessary to determine whether this element operates as a high-order or a
low-order good. This assignment should be done with caution, as it is easy to
make mistakes in assigning these labels. Specifically, what determines whether
an element is high-order or low-order is not strength of feeling, but the size of the
tributary area. For example, for an Armenian, ethnicity is a low-order good
because the geographic size of the Armenian homeland is a relatively compact
area even though his ties to Armenians are strong. For a Russian, ethnicity is
higher-order, because the area which is inhabited by ethnic Russians is large.
The factor of ethnicity is interesting because it may be treated two ways. In
the first, Great Russians would constitute the lower-order good for Moscow, and
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G: Large Central Place
B: Medium Central Place
K: Small Central Place
igure 11 Christaller's Hierarchy of Central Places
Source: de Blij, 1971, p. 83.
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related Slavs would be progressively higher-order. Therefore, Byelorussians and
Ukrainians would be middle-order, and Poles and South Slavs would be high-
order. In the second scheme, territory which contains a majority of ethnic
Russians would be a good of a low order. The protection of ethnic rights in
regions where Russians are a minority would be a good of a higher order. Both
schemes should be considered.
Some factors seem to exist only at the higher-order. Among these would be
collective defense, especially a collective nuclear defense. It is only by
subordinating themselves to Moscow that small, non-nuclear republics can achieve
this high-order good. This would help explain the formation of the CIS. At the
time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, each successor republic (including
Russia) was striving for increased independence from the others. In spite of this
strong centrifugal force, the limits of this policy were reached when the issue was
nuclear weapons. At least a nominal structure was necessary to ensure collective
responsibility and collective security. Political arrangements had to be made in
order to ensure that the demands for the high-order good of collective nuclear
security were met.
What occurs when the boundaries of higher-order factors such as collective
security change? The medium sized central places (B in Figure 11) have the
opportunity to exchange higher-order goods with either large central place (G).
Said another way, they can choose to subordinate themselves to the market area
of either large central place. In the realm of national security, the subordination
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of a small state to a larger state or defense alliance is a political decision. Such
associations can change with time. The changing of defense blocs increases the
tributary area for one large nation (or central place) at the expense of the other.
The geographic concept of a "shatterbelt" is useful here. A shatterbelt is
a region whose internal geographical, cultural, religious, and political
fragmentation is compounded by pressures from external major powers
attracted by the region's strategic location and economic resources. (Cohen,
1982, p. 226)
A shatterbelt is formed in the territory along the boundary of two larger nations or
empires. As the political, economic, and military fortunes of either large nation wax
or wane, the territory along the periphery is exchanged. The result over time is a
line of small, distinctive nations, which are never totally absorbed into either large
nation. The classic example of a shatterbelt zone is East Central Europe.
Shatterbelts tend to become the source of conflicts due to the overlapping
nature of loyalties and aspirations, of low- and high-order elements of the
propensity to defend. Seventy-nine percent of major power wars have been fought
in shatterbelt regions (Kelly, 1986). The key to understanding the potential for war
along the periphery of Russia is a recognition of the geographic overlap of these
conflicting claims over territory. This can only be accomplished by a thorough
understanding of the cultural, historical, economic, and military geography of a
region.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
Theoretical models have the power to help explain complex processes. A
geographic model should always be able to be applied to the physical world.
Matters of defense and war fighting are necessarily practical, and large numbers
of lives are at stake with the application of theory. In this chapter, the model of
defense will be applied to specific regions bordering on Russia. This will begin will
a discussion of Russian military doctrine. It is important to understand Russian
attitudes toward defense. Do they currently favor an offensive or defensive
posture? From whence do they see the threat? What does the military hierarchy
see as the role the armed forces?
The chapter will continue with short analyses of two regions: the Caucasus
and Central Asia. Two elements of the propensity to defend, ethnicity, and
collective security, will likewise be discussed. One element will be discussed in
each geographic area. The assignment of an element to a geographic area is




Military doctrine is a viewpoint under which military history is understood.
(Svechin, quoted in Proektor, 1993, p. 41)
General military doctrine is understood to mean a set of officially accepted
views expressing the attitude toward war and the determining nature of the
state's military tasks, and methods of achieving them and the main direction
of military force generation. ("General Provisions," p. 1)
The content of Moscow's military doctrine has undergone rapid changes in
the past several years. In May 1987, a military doctrine was announced which
declared a "defensive sufficiency" for the Soviet Union. The doctrine assumed the
continuation of the Warsaw Pact. However, not only has the Warsaw Pact been
dissolved, but the Soviet Union has collapsed. This was the first cause which
forced a major re-evaluation of Russian military doctrine.
The second force dictating a change in Russian military doctrine was the Gulf
War. In that war, "the Soviet Armed Forces have seen the future--and it works"
(FitzGerald, 1991
,
p. 1). The Gulf War demonstrated the effectiveness of modern
weaponry when combined with effective command, control, communications, and
intelligence.
Russian military doctrine is generally divided into two realms which exert a
strong influence upon each other: the political and the military-technical. The
bases of both realms of Russian doctrine have been changed. The political realm
changed with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. The
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dissolution of the Warsaw Pact radically altered the mutual defense obligations of
the Soviet Union. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union similarly changed
the defensive boundaries of Russia. With respect to the model of defense, this
was equivalent to a shift to the left of the propensity to defend curve, or d.
The military-technical realm of doctrine corresponds to issues affecting the
cost of defense curve. New innovations, such as reconnaissance-strike
complexes, change the costs of defeating an enemy army. When one nation or
coalition is armed with advanced conventional munitions, and the other is not, as
in the Gulf War, the side equipped with these weapons can prevail with a smaller
fighting force, and simultaneously minimize its own casualties, thereby also
reducing its domestic political costs.
The dilemma of Russian military doctrine is that it faces major challenges
from both halves, and must attempt to make appropriate adjustments more or less
simultaneously. It should be no surprise, then, that there is no unanimity to the
provisions of the draft doctrine. On the contrary, a vigorous debate has raged in
the Russian press about the content of military doctrine, especially since the
publication of a draft military doctrine in a special issue of Voyennaya Mysl'm May
1992.
The changes in the political realm will be dealt with in this chapter, and
Chapter V.
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C. DRAFT MILITARY DOCTRINE OF 1992
The draft military doctrine of May 1992 will be the basis of analysis of the
defense model. It was published as a transition document, and a new version will
not be released until approved by the Defense Ministry Collegium, Russian
Security Council, and the Russian Parliament (Lepingwell, 1993). The 1992 draft
contains several sections which are applicable to the model of defense.
1. No Enemies
The draft doctrine states, "Russian does not consider a single state or
coalition of states to be its enemy ("Fundamentals," p. 4)." Aside from the
international good will engendered by such a statement, it obviates the need to
define a strategic axis for defense. If Russia has no enemies, it no longer requires
the preparation of a theater, at least for large-scale operations. The military-
geographic problem of having no prepared theater, in which Russia currently finds
itself, is thereby defined away. That is not to say that the issue is totally ignored.
Strategic groupings of the Russian Armed Forces are established and
stationed with consideration for ensuring the capability of repelling aggression
on a local scale on any axis ("defense of all azimuths"), (emphasis added)
("Fundamentals," p. 4)
Valentin Larionov, the retired General-Major and military academic, who co-wrote
the preface to the English edition to Svechin's Strategy has commented on this
notion of having no defined axes.
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Can we be indifferent to the crescent of instability that has taken shape to the
south and southwest, in near and distant countries?...! cannot agree with the
formula of "defense in all directions." "In all directions" means nowhere in
particular. (Larionov, 1992, p. 86)
Russia today is unprepared for large-scale war, but local wars which
require a lower level of commitment can be foreseen on any axis.
2. Cooperation of Commonwealth Member-States
(The doctrine) assumes cooperation with member-states of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in accomplishing joint defense
tasks based on bi-lateral and multi-lateral intergovernmental treaties and
agreements, (emphasis in original) ("Fundamentals," p. 1)
This concept will be critical to the "near abroad" states of the former
Soviet Union. Russia assumes a high degree of integration with the armed forces
of these republics. Should the republics resist integration, the doctrine becomes
invalid. Not only are forces seen to be integrated, but national interests are
assumed to be equivalent between Russia and the "near abroad." The draft
doctrine repeatedly equates the concepts of "national" security or "national"
interests with "general national "(obshchenatsionalnyrf" security or interests. What
is meant by the term "general national?"
This term relates to the totality of Commonwealth states regardless of the
ethnic makeup of their population. ("Content of Selected Terms," pp. 6-7)
This is a clear assertion that the national interests of Russia and the "near abroad"
Commonwealth are identical.
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In fact, Russia is not necessarily staking its entire policy on the
Commonwealth. Russia is demonstrating a preference for accomplishing military
cooperation and mutual defense through a series of bi-lateral agreements, rather
than rely on the structure of the Commonwealth (Lepingwell, 1993).
3. Many Contradictions
The doctrine identifies what some of the sources of conflict might be:
Political, economic, territorial, religious, ethnic and other contradictions...may
lead to armed conflicts and wars (including civil wars). ("Fundamentals," p.1)
These contradictions are not explained further, with one exception, ethnic Russians
in the "near abroad."
A violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify
themselves with Russia ethnically and culturally in former USSR republics
can be a serious source of conflicts. ("Fundamentals," p. 2)
It implies an extension of Russian "common defense space" over those nations
with Russian ethnic and cultural minorities and the implication of a right to
intervene on behalf of those minorities. For the model of defense, this would be
an area over which the high-order good of Russian ethnicity and the low-order
good of ethnicity of the national republic overlap. Should a republic of the "near
abroad" seek foreign help to resist Russia, there could be direct consequences.
Russia will view the introduction of foreign troops on the territory of
contiguous states as well as a buildup of army and navy groupings at its
borders as a direct military threat. In this case it reserves to itself to take
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steps necessary to guarantee its own security." (emphasis in original)
("Fundamentals," p. 2)
Note that in the Russian view, the presence of its troops in Lithuania would not
constitute a threat for example, to Poland, but the converse does not apply. In the
Russian view, the presence of foreign troops in Lithuania would constitute a direct
military threat to Russia. Russia therefore sees itself playing a special role in the
shatterbelt republics of the "near abroad." The high-order good of collective
defense can only be satisfied by subordination to Moscow, not some other state.
4. Structure of Russian Armed Forces
The draft doctrine foresees three types of armed forces for Russia:
1
.
Permanent readiness forces in theaters of military operations (or on axes)
2. Mobile, rapid reaction forces, capable of deploying to a theater of military
operations for the repelling of medium-scale aggression
3. Strategic reserves formed during a threat period or war to conduct large-
scale operations. ("Fundamentals," p. 5)
The permanent readiness forces would essentially be static, garrison units in the
periphery. It has been proposed to use Cossack units in this, their traditional role
of border defense (Shlyk, 1993). In times of crisis, the mobile forces would then
deploy to assist the permanent forces.
Military doctrine, as Svechin said, must be subordinate to politics. In
order to coincide with political goals and economic realities, some compromise of
doctrine may be necessary.
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There appears to be a unanimously held view on the part of Russian's
military leadership that the course of partnership with the western world is not
congruent with Russia's interests and that Russian's security requirements
would be better served by a more assertive policy toward the "near abroad",
leading perhaps to the re-forging of some sort of Russian-led alliance of
former Soviet republics. However, the on-going withdrawal of the
Northwestern Groups of Forces from the Baltic States suggest that some
senior generals accept the need for the temporary surrender of military
influence in the "near abroad" as the price for rebuilding Russia's military
machine. (Lough, 1993, p. 27)
D. ETHNICITY AND THE REPUBLICS OF THE CAUCASUS
The mountain region of the Caucasus republics illustrates several important
factors relating to defense and ethnicity. The physical setting of a mountain
region, with its isolated valleys and limited lines of communication, tends to
encourage the development of small cultural, linguistic, and ethnic minorities who
may have little in common with neighboring peoples in adjacent valleys, or in the
lowlands.
In mountain areas around the world, the inhabitants tend to be culturally
distinct, independent, insular, and clannish. Examples of such groups are the
Berbers in North Africa, the Swiss, Nepalese, Druze and other groups in Lebanon,
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. The factors of ethnicity and
language which tend to be lower-order goods in most areas, are even more so in
mountain areas.
This takes place for various reasons. The first is cultural isolation. The
relative difficulty of travel in mountain areas ensures that the inhabitants have
minimal contact with outsiders. The diffusion of technological innovations and
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cultural influences is thereby slowed. The second reason is that inhabitants of
lowlands tend to ignore the isolated pockets of minorities who inhabit the mountain
areas. As long as the mountain people remain in their homeland, they are not a
political or military threat. Another reason is that mountainous areas are more
easily defended. The inhabitants can sustain themselves, and their culture, within
their homeland. Some of the most ancient cultures survive in mountain valleys.
Mountain people make use of natural defenses and can withstand invasions which
tend to sweep away peoples who inhabit the plains.
The Caucasus region contains a large number of relatively small native ethnic
groups. These include Azeris, Armenians, Georgians, Abkhaz, Lezgins, Chechens,
Ingush, Kurds, Ossetians and others. The groups have varying levels of national
consciousness and cultural development. The multitude of ethnic groups is
complicated by the fact that they do not necessarily live in compact, contiguous
national homelands. One group may be spatially interspersed within other groups.
This affects the political stability of the regions since it is not possible to create
political entities which reflect the composition of all the people living in a region.
According to the model of defense, the element of ethnicity may not be satisfied
locally at all, but only through extension to the ethnic homeland, which may be
located two valleys over.
During the Soviet period, the "nationalities question" was considered to have
been solved, and all people theoretically had the same cultural rights. Large
linguistic minorities were accorded status as constituent republics of the Soviet
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Union. These republics were granted a certain status which included some rights
of cultural development and expression which varied with the changing policies of
Moscow. Smaller minority groups, either within Russia or in one of the other
fourteen constituent republics, were analogously accorded minority rights and
accorded political status through the establishment of Autonomous Republics,
Oblasts, or Krays. The boundaries (and even the existence) of these regions
changed over time with Moscow's policy.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, all constituent republics of the former
Soviet Union were accorded international recognition as independent states. The
same principle did not hold for the second-order Autonomous Republics or
Oblasts. They may be as culturally distinct, as nationally conscious, and with a
culture that is as highly developed as a constituent republic, but today they have
no independence.
The problem is illustrated by the conflict in South Ossetia. South Ossetia is
a region located in the Republic of Georgia. The goal of the South Ossetians is
to unite with North Ossetia, which is across the frontier as part of the Russian
Federation. If the Ossetian goal is realized, it would entail a change in political
boundaries, that is, a transfer of territory from Georgia to Russia.
Political boundaries exist primarily as ideas. The boundary may coincide with
a river or mountain ridge for simplicity of identification, but there need be no
physical manifestation of a boundary. A political boundary is a thing of delicacy.
The strength of a political boundary is similar to an egg shell. As long as the
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integrity of the boundary is maintained, the shell is surprisingly strong. It is
mutually reinforcing, and can withstand large external pressures. However, if the
shell is broken at any point, it loses its integral strength, and the contents are lost.
In Ossetia, both Russia and Georgia want to maintain their own political
integrity. They are incidently bound by the UN charter, the Council for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and (on the Russian side) the CIS charter, all
of which oblige the members to maintain territorial integrity. Ossetia, divided
between the two, finds its aspirations in conflict with the higher-order requirements
to maintain political integrity. This is of vital interest to Russia, which is itself a
federation that faces strong centrifugal forces. A change in the external
boundaries of the Federation, like the cracking of an egg, will immediately call into
question the existence of the Russian state itself.
Nagorno-Karabakh provides another example of a nation divided. One
portion of the Armenian people live in Armenia proper, and achieved full
independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The irredenta, living
in Nagorno-Karabakh, did not. This was due to the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh
was only afforded the status of an Autonomous Oblast within the constituent
republic of Azerbaijan during the Soviet period. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it remained within the boundaries of a newly independent Azerbaijan. This
exclave of ethnic Armenians declared its independence in January 1992 as the
self-styled "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic," which does not have international
recognition (Fuller, 1993). Moscow's involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh has been
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much less than in South Ossetia. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the
political integrity of Russia's borders are not at stake. When Armenia tried to
invoke the CIS Mutual Defense Agreement, Moscow rejected it out of hand (Fuller,
1993, pp. 20-22).
The Lezgin people face a similar situation to the Ossetians. The Lezgins
inhabit a territory in northeastern Azerbaijan, and in southern Dagestan, which is
part of the Russian Federation. Estimates of the size of this ethnic group range
from over 450,000 (Sheehy, 1990) to as many as one million (Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
1992). Since 1991 they have made demands for an independent state carved
from Dagestan and Azerbaijan. The growing unrest of the Lezgins was expressed
by protests in both Dagestan and Azerbaijan in June 1992. The proximate cause
of this unrest was Yeltsin's announcement that new frontier regulations would be
instituted between Russia and Azerbaijan. These restrictions, including visa
requirements, would have divided the population and hindered contacts. To
defuse this potentially violent situation, Russia subsequently announced that an
effort would be made to deter smuggling, but that there would be no frontier
controls (Fuller, 1992). The two halves of the Lezgin people have been pacified
by Russian and Azerbaijan, at least temporarily, by granting modest concessions.
These concessions fulfill the low-order aspirations of cultural contacts between
Lezgin while simultaneously maintaining the high-order political boundaries. This
technique holds potential for future application elsewhere along Russia's periphery.
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E. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND CENTRAL ASIA
In the preceding section ethnicity as an element of the propensity to defend
was examined. In this section one element which is often in conflict with ethnicity,
that of collective security, will be examined. The desire for collective security is
a complex one. It is not visceral like ethnonationalism, its motivations are more
intellectual. Typically, nations band together due to a perceived weakness. This
may be caused by a poor economy, weak armed forces, competing border claims,
and the proximity of strong neighbors. All of these elements are found in Central
Asia today.
The Central Asian republics have the lowest per-capita income in the former
Soviet Union. The strategic situation of the five republics of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan is complicated by the fact
that they have a relatively large territory, but a low population density. The border
between China and Tadjikistan is in dispute. There are other border anomalies:
within Kyrgyzstan there are two enclaves belonging to Uzbekistan (lordan and
Soch), and one belonging to Tadjikistan (Voruch). Besides China, the region also
borders Iran and Afghanistan, in which a civil war is still continuing.
The five republics have the potential for cooperation on many levels: they
have linguistic similarities and are at least nominally Islamic.
The idea of a Central Asian Commonwealth is not new. The concept of a
"Turkestan" encompassing the entire region predated Russian domination by many
centuries (Critchlow, 1992). It existed in concrete form as a political entity during
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the last half of the nineteenth century, and through the Soviet period until 1925
when the division into individual constituent republics began (Marnie and Whitlock,
1993, p. 39).
There are, however, strong factors acting against a tight integration. First,
the republics desire their own political independence after the long domination of
Moscow. Second, due to the legacy of central planning during the Soviet period,
the economies tend to be integrated with Russia, rather than with each other
(Marnie and Whitlock). Lastly, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Tadjikistan are all members of the CIS. Therefore, they acquire their high-level
good of common defense through its structure. The fifth republic, Turkmenistan
has a bi-lateral defense agreement with Russia (Zhurvenko, 1993). However, the
main threat to the region has proved to be internal, rather than external.
1. Tadjik Civil War
A civil war began in Tadjikistan in May 1992. It continued through the
summer and autumn until the opposition was apparently crushed near year's end.
However, the seeds for future conflict still exist. Tadjik government officials have
estimated that between 20,000 and 70,000 lives have been lost, and hundreds of
thousands have fled as refugees (Brown, 1993a, p. 9).
The proximate cause of the civil war was the growing influence of
political parties opposed to the neo-communist government led by President
Rakhmon Nabiev. These parties included the Tadjik nationalist movement,
Rastokhez, the Western-oriented Democratic Party of Tadjikistan, and Islamic
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fundamentalists. There was a strong geographic element to the opposition. It was
centered in Garm and in Kurgan-Tyube to which many people migrated from Garm
(Brown, 1 993a, p. 10). The nationalist agenda of the opposition provoked a violent
response from the communists, and fighting raged throughout the summer (Brown,
1993b, p. 10). By September, the President was forced to resign, and the
opposition groups took effective control of power in Dushanbe. This power was
short-lived, however, as Islamic forces could not resist the pro-communists, and
the opposition-led government was forced to resign on 1 November 1 992 (Brown,
1993a, pp. 10-11). The return of communist forces were marked by brutal
repression against the opposition. (Brown, 1993b).
2. Threat of Contagion
What turned the tide for the pro-communist forces? It was largely the
result of active intervention by Russia (which it has denied) and Uzbekistan. This
took the form of humanitarian aid and the direct combat support of the Uzbek Air
Force and ground troops (Panico, 1993, pp. 40-41).
What was the motivation for such intervention? The president of
Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has claimed that Uzbek involvement was motivated by
the threat of Islamic fundamentalism being exported across the Afghan-Tadjik
border. In reality, it was as much in response to his own domestic political
situation.
Karimov faces a domestic situation similar to Tadjikistan. The
democratic opposition movement, known as Birlik (Unity) has been joined by a
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small Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) which has been officially outlawed since a
1991 law banning political parties with a religious platform (Cavanaugh, 1992).
Karimov has sought to maintain his own authoritarian control of
Uzbekistan. His assumption of power in 1989 coincided with the riots in the
Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan. Since then he has feared that an outbreak of
violence would be caused by any liberalization or loss of government control.
Karimov appealed to the CIS and even the UN for help during the civil war to stop
the contagion of Islamic fundamentalism (Brown, 1993c).
What the Uzbek president understood intuitively is borne out by
empirical research. This shows that wars tend to spread from one state to
another, especially when they have similar circumstances (Starr and Most, 1983,
1985, Houweling and Siccama, 1985).
For the model of defense, this contagion should be expected when
neighboring states have a similar pattern of unresolved low-order ethnic demands,
overlapping claims to political boundaries, assertions of collective defense, etc.
The element of collective security in the Tadjik civil war shows the peculiar way it
can be expressed. In order to effect collective defense, it must be invoked along
the periphery. Karimov was attempting to preclude domestic problems by joining
battle when the threat was still beyond his borders.
The technique of preemptively intervening in the civil war should be
expected to be applied elsewhere in the future at various points around the
periphery of Russia. If the Russian leadership thinks that certain elements of its
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national interest are threatened, and the costs of delaying military action will
ultimately increase the cost of defense, they may decide to launch a preemptive
operation.
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V. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: THE MAKING OF A "PET"
INTRODUCTION
Was it right for a lady of eighteenth-century England to keep a black boy as
a pet? She thought so, for did she not dress the boy in finery and allow him
special privileges? Of course, some of us are now inclined to disagree,
arguing that the boy's dignity was compromised by his pet status and even
by his mistress' acts of favor and indulgence. Affection mitigates domination,
making it softer and more acceptable, but affection itself is possible only in
relationships of inequality. It is the warm and superior feeling one has
toward things that one can care for and patronize. The word care so exudes
humaneness that we tend to forget its almost inevitable tainting by patronage
and condescension in our imperfect world. (Tuan, 1984, p. 5)
In this paper I will be further discussing the model of defense developed
earlier. In particular, I will be examining one element of the propensity to defend,
that of historical ties. This element will be applied to the relationship between
Russia and Ukraine.
The element of historical ties is necessarily an extremely complex one. Just
as geography is the study of human and physical processes as expressed in two-
(or three-) dimensional space, history includes all those processes through the
fourth dimension, time. This adds a richness to the element of the propensity to
defend which is not present in, for example, the element of economic relationships.
Historical ties necessarily touch on each of the other elements. Such ties leave
not only physical artifacts such as settlement patterns, transportation networks,
72
industrial and military centers, but also psychological artifacts such as the national
myths of a people and what they say about this people's place in the world, with
respect to surrounding peoples. Although it is exceedingly complex, it is within
such a nexus of competing aims, aspirations, and myths, and their expression in
two-dimensional space that Russia, Ukraine, or any nation must resolve the
question of over what territory it will extend a claim, and how it will defend this
claim.
The full scope of Ukrainian-Russian relations is beyond the reach of this
chapter, and the abilities of the author. The author is neither Ukrainian nor
Russian, and therefore does not have the benefit of learning, from childhood, the
myths that express the national consciousness of these peoples. However there
is hope in this richness of symbols for an outside observer. National myths exist
in the plural: the symbols overlay one another like the leaves of a book. It may
just be possible to examine one or two leaves, however crudely.
The Ukrainian-Russian relationship is also important to all of the other
republics of the former Soviet Union. Besides Russia, Ukraine has the largest
population, large agricultural and industrial resources, the strongest military force,
including nuclear weapons, and therefore, the attention of the world community.
If Ukraine is unable to maintain a separate existence from Moscow, it is doubtful
that any of the other republics (with the possible exception of the Baltics) will be
able to do so either.
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To understand the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, it is necessary to delve
into the historic roots of both the Russian and Ukrainian nations.
Without an adequate understanding of these premodern ethnic identities, we
debar ourselves from coming to terms with the often deepseated conflicts
between ethnic communities that continue to erupt.... Such conflicts and
problems emerge primarily from rival, and sometimes incompatible, myths,
symbols, and memories that define the traditions and value-systems of
different ethnic communities when these are brought, usually by external
agencies, into close proximity and often unequal relations.... Unequal
relationships without the sense of ethnic difference founded on rival
mythomoteurs and memories may encourage other forms of conflict, but not
ethnic antagonisms. (Smith, 1992, p. 48)
The foundation of the ideas of both the Russian and Ukrainian nations lie with
the history of Kievan Rus'. A short discussion of this history must therefore be the
basis of any examination of Russian-Ukrainian relations.
The dynastic origins of Kievan Rus' are not found in Eastern Europe. During
the 9th century Varangian, or Viking, tribes from Scandinavia penetrated Eastern
Europe via the Gulf of Finland. Following their establishment in Novgorod, the
Varangians extended their influence over the local Slavic peoples southward,
following the Dnieper river. In 882, Oleh, the first historically verifiable ruler of
Rus', conquered Kiev and established his authority over a wide area. At one point,
this even included an attack on Constantinople. From that period until its zenith
in the late 10th and early 11th centuries, Kievan Rus' covered the upper reaches
of the Dnieper and Volga Rivers to Lake Ladoga, including the locations of modern
Kiev, Moscow, and St. Petersburg (Subtelny, 1988, pp. 24-33).
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An argument has raged among historians as to the extent of the Varangian's
influence upon the native Slavic tribes. The earliest East Slavic chronicle, the
"Chronicle of Bygone Years," underscores the role of the Varangians, even to the
point of stating that the Slavs purposefully invited the Norsemen in as rulers, as
they found themselves incapable of ordering their own affairs. This idea was taken
up in the eighteenth century by German historians who founded the so-called
"Normanist" school. According to this school, and the "Chronicle of Bygone
Years," the name "Rus"' was the name of that particular tribe of Varangians who
became the rulers of Kievan Rus' (Subtelny, pp. 22-23). While this school was
popular among Germans, it understandably has been less so among Slavs.
The Normanist explanation provoked its antithesis which emphasized the
native Slavic elements of the culture and political organization. The anti-Normanist
school included both Hrushevsky, and Russian historians. Some members of this
school have sought to demonstrate that the word "Rus"' originally came from the
Rus and Rusna rivers in Ukraine, or alternatively, it was the name of another, non-
Varangian, tribe (Subtelny, pp. 22-23).
The importance of Kievan Rus', and its origins is that it provides the basis for
the historical myths of both Russia and Ukraine. Kievan Rus' was a large,
politically powerful entity that could challenge the other great powers of the period.
It established a tie between an ethnic group, the East Slavs, the land that they
occupied, and a state which existed to govern them. These are the roots of
modern ethnonationalism. Reinforcing these factors is the fact that it was during
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the period of Kievan Rus', and through the conversion of Volodymyr (Vladimir) in
988 that Orthodoxy entered into Russian lands. Thus, the history of Kievan Rus'
contains not only the political, but also the religious roots of the Russian state.
The other important aspect of the Kievan controversy is, "which people has
the claim to the inheritance of Rus'?" Who can claim to be the direct political
descendent of this polity? The political organization of Rus' degenerated over
time, and each local prince maintained his own dynasty. This strengthened the
regional principalities at the expense of Kiev. The larger fragments following the
breakup of Kievan Rus' were sustained in Kiev, Galicia, Novgorod, and Vladimir
(Pelenski, pp. 29-52). Within the Vladimir principality, the town of Moscow was
established and eventually eclipsed Vladimir to become the center of the modern
Russian state. It is through this line and the historic political continuity of this
principality that Moscow claims to be the successor of Kievan Rus'. The Ukrainian
claim is based not only on ethnicity and culture, but the physical location of Kiev
as the center of Rus'.
The importance of Kievan Rus' for the Model of Defense is the role it plays
in the national myths of Russia and Ukraine. By claiming the dynastic, and
therefore political, inheritance of Rus', a state may assert a claim of historical
legitimacy over this same territory. To the annoyance of Ukraine, this assertion
by Moscow seems not only to usurp the historical legacy which rightly belongs to
Kiev, but it also implies a contemporary claim to the territory of Ukraine as
"Russian" as opposed to "Ukrainian." Russian and Ukrainian claims to the element
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of historical legitimacy over the heart of Ukrainian territory are therefore
superimposed. This forms the basis for future clashes between Russia and
Ukraine.
B. UKRAINE: THE BORDERLAND
The word "Ukraine" means "borderland." This immediately raises the
question, "bordering on what?" According to Subtelny, the word originally
appeared in Chronicles in 1187, referring to the lands which surrounded Kiev
(Subtelny, p.23). In later centuries, this term referred to those lands lying on the
periphery of what was considered the civilized world, that is, the buffer zone
between the Christian and Islamic nations (Subtelny, p. 105). This area could be
seen as the "borderland" from the perspective of Russia, Lithuania, Poland,
Bulgaria, the Mongol Khanate, or the Ottoman Turks. It denotes the partition of
Ukrainian territory that existed until the re-uniting of Ukraine in a single polity in this
century. By adopting the term "Ukrainian," the sundered peoples within the
Hapsburg and Russian empires lost a concept of their own cultural centrality, but
gained a concept of cultural distinctiveness.
In the late 19th and early 20th century, nationally conscious West Ukrainians
began to call themselves "Ukrainians," a national theme that had been
adopted by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the east. There are two basic
reasons for abandoning the traditional designation Rusyn (Ruthenian) : it was
felt that Rusyn was too similar to Ruskyi (Russian) and, by adopting the
name used by their compatriots in the Russian empire, the West Ukrainians
wished to stress their unity with them. (Subtelny, 1988, p. 307)
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Due to the incorporation of the territory into Russia, and then the Soviet
Union, the modern Russian usage of the term must connote the "borderlands" from
the perspective of Moscow. This is reinforced in the consciousness through
everyday usage of the term.
There are three possible ways to psychologically segment the space of a
"borderland." First, it can connote the foreign land beyond the border. Second,
it can connote the border itself and the lands on either side of it. Thirdly, it can be
the domestic territory one crosses when approaching the line demarking what is
"ours" from what is "theirs." An example of the latter would be to refer to Texas,
Arizona, New Mexico, and California as "the border states." It denotes proximity
to something foreign, without diminishing the psychological sense of US
sovereignty over those states. This is the situation that Ukraine finds itself in
today: it is still seen from the perspective of Moscow as located "inside" Russia,
and the truly foreign lands do not begin until one has passed beyond the
"borderlands." It is seen this way not only by many Russians, but by many in the
West. It is not seen this way by Ukrainian nationalists.
While it may be seen as being "inside" Russia, the idea of a borderland has
other implications. It can never be seen, from Moscow's perspective, as part of
the national heartland, Kievan Rus' notwithstanding. Rather, the idea of a
borderland implies a cultural hinterland. In this respect, the attitude of Russia
toward the Ukrainian language takes on new meaning. For Russia, the Ukrainian
language was a peasant dialect. For Ukrainians to fully participate as members
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of the empire, it would be necessary to cleave to the superior culture and accept
Russian. This denial of Ukrainian language took blatant forms, such as the Ems
Ukaz of 1 876 which forbade the use of Ukrainian in schools, in public life, and
therefore sought to cripple a distinctive Ukrainian culture and encourage Russian
culture. No doubt the tsar and Russian authorities thought they were doing
Ukrainians a favor. It is this humaneness, this caring, as Tuan defined it in the
quote on the first page of this chapter, which masks the domination of, and
condescension toward, another. This will be explored next.
C. UKRAINE AS "PET"
As mentioned previously, the self-identity of a people is exceedingly complex,
with an overlay of sometimes conflicting images and symbols. The
interrelationship between Ukrainians and Russians, and their respective concepts
of each other is very rich. The author will posit the existence of one such image:
that of Ukraine as a "pet."
The term "pet" should be thought of abstractly. Yi-Fu Tuan goes beyond the
category of domesticated animals to include such things as gardens, fountains,
topiary, eunuchs, children, women, dwarfs, and fools (Tuan, 1984). To them the
author will add "nations." What this wide variety of categories has in a common
in an unequal relationship, a relationship in which they are dominated by a
stronger individual or group. However, they are protected, nurtured, and showered
with affection by the dominator. In order to examine how this framework might
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apply to Russia and Ukraine, it will be necessary to more fully explore the nature
of the master-pet relationship.
1 . Dominance and Affection
Power is a quality almost universally respected. It can be the blatant
power of a thundering waterfall, or the latent power (and potential danger) of a lion
lounging on the savanna. It can be expressed through gigantic industrial works,
or the command of a language in poetry. Sexual potency is something eagerly
sought, jealously guarded, and if lost, something on which millions are spent to
retrieve.
Such power often times has a wild nature, something which is
potentially out of control. Like sex, it must be contained within some sort of
structure of accepted norms. Like the explosions within an internal combustion
engine, power is something that is most useful when it is contained and directed.
A nuclear weapon represents the most destructive power ever created by man.
But the ability of nuclear weapons to deter is due to the fear that once released,
such power cannot be contained. "Knowledge is power," and as such, intelligence
is yet another form of power. In the information age, knowledge can be a very
potent form of power.
It is in the comparison of one person or thing to another that power
changes to dominance. Two people may be powerful, but for one to be
considered dominant, he must be more powerful than the other. To say that the
Japanese auto makers are becoming dominant is to speak of market share, rather
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than absolute numbers of cars sold. With respect to Russians and Ukrainians, the
terms used are interesting. The historic term used by Russians for Ukraine is not
Ukraina but Malorossiia ("Little Russia") a term which in Russian connotes not only
diminutive size, but also a sense of insufficiency. The striving to create diminutive
forms is a common characteristic of the master-pet relationship, as it increases
one's relative power to the pet. It can be seen in the selective breeding of
Shetland ponies, miniature canine breeds, "dwarf" varieties of fruits, and the art of
bonsai.
For Tuan, the second element in the making of a pet is affection. This
element is not the antithesis of dominance, which would be submissiveness.
Affection, as he refers to it, is the anodyne of dominance. It is this ability to
soothe, or palliate, the raw expression of power that justifies the making of a pet
in the mind of the master. Pets are things that share an intimacy with the master,
that are cared for, or even doted upon. Dogs and cats may be allowed free
access to the living space in many families, in a sense become a member of the
household, crossing not just familial lines, but species boundaries. They are
sheltered, fed, played with, and "petted." Without intimacy and affection,
dominance becomes a master-slave relationship.
2. Ukraine as Garden
For Tuan, a garden is the classic example of a botanical pet. It is an
expression of the vitality and strength of nature, but is tamed and directed by a
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gardener. The power of nature thereby is overwhelmed by the power of a human
being, and serves as an expression of human dominance.
The garden may be divided into two basic forms, the formal garden, and
the vegetable garden. In a formal garden, the expression of human dominance
is taken to the extreme. Exotic species are introduced. These, or native species,
are typically selectively bred so that they may display desired characteristics.
Often times, it matters not what those characteristics are, so long as they are
novel and distinctive. The custom of trimming of hedges allows the plant to display
a mathematical precision that is impossible in the natural world. The use of topiary
in a formal garden allows the gardener to transform a plant into shapes that even
selective breeding cannot produce, for example, the shape of an animal. The
essence of a formal garden is the capricious display of man's dominance over
nature.
How does Ukraine resemble such a garden? To both Russians and
Ukrainians, Ukraine is a more orderly republic than Russia. Flowers and lawns are
in greater abundance. The natural disorder of Russia stands in contrast to the
neat and tidy public and private spaces of Ukraine. This immediately struck the
author upon arriving in Kiev from Moscow.
The second type of garden is the vegetable garden. This serves a
more practical function, the feeding of the family, but is similar to a formal garden
in that specific varieties are planted, rather than naturally arise, and it is tended by
a gardener.
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Ukraine also bears a resemblance to this type of garden. Its rich lands
with chernozem soil have been known as the granary of Europe for centuries. Its
association with agriculture and peasants is deep. If the thesis of Robert Conquest
(1986) is true: that the famine of 1932-33 was a deliberate act aimed at crushing
Ukrainian nationalism, the methods of de-kulakization and collectivization were well
chosen. By destroying Ukrainian agriculture, the Ukrainian nation was dealt a
heavy blow. But Conquest's task was difficult: the ideas of peasantry and the
Ukrainian nation are so closely tied together that they are almost impossible to
separate.
Another way that Ukraine is like a garden has already been touched
upon: the ancient origins of the Russian and Ukrainian states. The original Kievan
Rus' can be seen as a Garden of Eden, the place of origins. But, as in Eden, the
time of blissful innocence was not to last. Corruption and fratricidal war shattered
the state, and (at least from the Russian side) the survivors were forced to take
refuge elsewhere.
How are gardens used? They may decorate the spaces around public
buildings, they may be used as urban parks, they can be in or around homes, or
especially in the Russian experience, around the country dacha. The gardens
around a home may be differentiated: flowers, lawns, and hedges tend to be in
front, in the public space of the home; vegetable gardens in the rear. In either
case, these garden areas are immediately adjacent to the domicile, in a zone of
great personal intimacy. While they are located outside of the home itself, they
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are often contained within a fence or other symbolic border which delineates this
personal property or space from the public space of strangers walking the streets.
This resonates with the idea of Ukraine as not part of the Russian home per se,
but still "belonging" to Russia, as Russian personal property.
There is one aspect of the making of a pet that has not been explored,
that of the perspective of the pet. The experience of a pet is one of pampered
attention, but also one of submissiveness and loss of independence. The pet has
no independent power base from which to draw strength. The medieval eunuch
may have been allowed to achieve high status even in the administrative structure
of his lord, but this is only possible because it was obvious he had no independent
source of strength, and therefore constituted no threat of usurpation.
The line between affection and cruelty is fine one, especially when
dealing with intimate subordinates. It can easily go unnoticed in the master,
confused with harmless amusement. The following story was told by an eleven-
year-old Theodore Roosevelt, whose family came across a group of beggars in
Italy:
We tossed the cakes to them and fed them like chickens with small pieces
of cake and like chickens they ate it. Mr. Stevens (a traveling companion)
kept guard with a whip with which he pretended to whip a small boy. We
made them open their mouth and tossed cake into it. We made the crowds
give us three cheers for U.S.A. before we gave them cakes. (McCullough,
1981, p. 15)
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The awarding of the Crimea to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev, who had
participated in the horrors of collectivization, can be seen as the capricious tossing
of a tasty treat into the open mouths of the Ukrainians who managed to survive the
first half of this century.
D. UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
The Ukrainian nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has left
the current Ukrainian state in a delicate situation. The drive for a national
consciousness has largely been one of resisting assimilation and claiming national
distinctiveness from Russia.
The current Ukrainian government has stated that Ukraine will exist for all
residents of Ukraine, rather than for just ethnic Ukrainians. This choice is an
explicit statement that Ukraine will be a multi-national state, and does much to
allay the fears of Russians and other minorities that their civil and cultural rights
will not be infringed upon. But it also causes a bi-furcation of Ukrainian patriotism.
For a Ukrainian, the three of elements of land, people, and state, all Ukrainian, are
coincident and his patriotism can be a full nationalism. For a Russian in Ukraine,
only two of these, land and state, are coincident, and therefore his patriotism must
remain "statism." Russian culture and ethnicity are "high-order" goods which can
only be satisfied in association with the larger Russian culture and with the
Russian state.
85
Multi-national states can be successful. Switzerland is the best example, with
Belgium as a generally successful example. However, there are several features
in these two examples which do not apply to Ukraine. The cultural rights of each
group in Switzerland and Belgium are rather explicitly protected. Also, there is no
single dominant group. More importantly, there is a geographic division of the land
into cultural territories. The new world has examples of successful multi-ethnic
states such as the United States and Canada. But these two states are held
together by an idea, rather than a blood bond. There is no group (with the
exception of Native Americans) that can assert an historic claim to the land in the
US and Canada.
The idea of the current division of Eastern Europe is that there should be
three East Slavic states: Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, in which the cultural rights
of all citizens would be protected in each state. This immediately begs the
question, "Why three states?" If each state is just like the next, with respect to
cultural rights, why not one? Why not ten? The answer, of course, is that they
are not just like one another: they represent three separate cultures. The
strengthening of national consciousness and distinctiveness will necessarily
highlight the differences between the predominant national culture in each of these
states, and the cultural minorities living within their boundaries.
This bi-furcation of Ukrainian patriotism into nationalism on the one hand and
statism on the other can be a source for future conflict between Russian and
Ukraine. It can be expected that Russians will take a strong interest in ethnic
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Russians living in Ukraine. Indeed, there are areas, such as Crimea, in which
ethnic Russians constitute a majority of the population. Should conflicts develop
between Ukraine and Russia there is the potential for them to take on a
particularly malicious character. This is due to the intimacy and shared history
between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian self-assertiveness can seem to Russians
as insubordination: the little brother betraying the family. The pet deciding he
wants to be master.
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VI. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL OF DEFENSE
As a practical matter, the Russian Federation will have to determine what
territory it is prepared to defend. The Russian army cannot begin adequate
preparations for the defense of this territory until its boundaries are determined by
the political leadership.
This uncertain situation demands a fresh approach to an analysis of Russian
defense policy. As part of this, a model of defense is necessary which will take
into account both the intentions and capabilities of Russia. It must be sufficiently
flexible to account for changes in government policy, and changes in technology.
The model of defense in this thesis adapts the ideas of two geographers,
Halford Mackinder and Johann Heinrich von Thunen. Mackinder identified
changing technology, specifically, the development of a railway network in Russia,
as the agent which would allow the "Heartland" to resume its natural, historic role
in world affairs. Inherent in the Mackinder model is the concept of an interior core
which is easier for a land power such as Russia to control. However, defense of
the territory beyond this interior zone becomes progressively more complicated and
more costly.
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Von Thiinen's theory is a model of economic geography. He theorized that
in the territory surrounding an isolated market center, a differentiation of
agricultural land use would develop. Crops of lower value would be raised in
concentric rings progressively further from the market center. At some distance
from the center, a point is reached in which the cost of sending a good to market
exceeds the value of that good. Beyond this point is wilderness.
Like Mackinder, the model of defense uses a concept of a core area. This
is the area that it is easiest to defend. Like von Thiinen's agricultural products, the
costs of defense rise with increasing distance from this core. This defense can be
either static or dynamic. Examples of a static defense would be fixed surface-to-
air missile sites, air defense bases, border troops, prepared fortifications, coastal
defense batteries, etc. As the radius of the area defended increases, so do the
number of these batteries, fortifications, troops, etc., therefore increasing the costs.
For a dynamic defense, one which includes expeditionary forces extending power
abroad, the costs also grow in proportion to increasing distance from the core.
This is due to fuel costs and the increasing size and complexity of the logistics
lines. It also includes the political costs of projecting power beyond one's own
borders.
The model of defense also accounts for the national interests of a nation:
what it will want to defend. The model theorizes that there are certain territories
which are more valuable than others for a nation. Defense of the core area is
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vital, with a decrease in national interest with increasing distance from the core.
This is called the propensity to defend.
The propensity to defend is a complex factor of the model of defense. It is
made up of many elements including ethnicity, cultural ties, economic value,
historic ties, political integrity, the need for collective defense, and even a people's
psychology and their vision of the world and their place and role in it. To account
for the propensity to defend, it is necessary to consider all of these elements which
determine the value a nation such as Russia places upon a given geographic
space.
When one combines the cost of defense with the propensity to defend, the
model can be analyzed abstractly. At the core, costs to defend this area are low.
The value placed on this area is high. Therefore, the decision will be made to
defend it. With increasing distance from the core, the value placed on the land
decreases while the costs to defend it simultaneously increase. This progresses
to the equilibrium point. This is the furthest extent which a nation will militarily
defend the territory. Beyond this point, national interest is too low and the costs
too high. This is the first stage of the model.
The territory a nation will defend obviously changes over time. This may
have either of two causes: in the first case, the cost of defense changes. This
may be due to changes in technology, making weaponry more (or less) expensive.
It may also vary due to a change in the economic situation of a country. If the
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economy deteriorates, the cost of defense increases, and the equilibrium point
moves inward toward the core of the nation, reducing the area defended.
The second possible cause of a change in the equilibrium point is a shift in
the propensity to defend. This can be caused by a political change which alters
the value placed on a given territory by a nation. One historical example would
be the wariness of the US to become involved in a foreign land war following the
Vietnam experience. This implies a lowering of the propensity of defend, also
reducing the area defended.
The propensity to defend not only includes economic and political
considerations, but also visceral motivations such as ethnonationalism or
attachment to place. Here the work of geographer Yi-Fu Tuan is valuable. He has
coined the term topophilia to refer to man's attachment to place. This often takes
the form of a complex national myth or cosmology. The humanities are not a
common field of study for military strategists and warfighters, but only by using the
techniques of the humanities can such complex motivations be understood.
The notion of defense of a territory necessarily includes the concept of a
foreign challenge to that territory. Defense is always against something else. The
geographic model known as Central Place Theory as developed by Walter
Christaller provides a useful analog for understanding the actions of two or more
actors who have competing claims over territory. The propensity to defend is
made up of many elements. An economic system is similarly made up of many
different goods and services. Each of these goods has a "tributary area," that is,
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the region in which people will travel to acquire that good. For each good, the size
of the tributary area is different: people will travel only a short distance for a gallon
of milk, but a long distance for high-fashion women's clothing. In Central Place
Theory, the goods which have small geographic tributary areas are called "low-
order" goods. Those which have large tributary area are termed "high-order"
goods. In Central Place Theory, small towns or "central places" trade in only "low-
order" goods, medium-sized towns trade in low- and medium-order goods. Large
cities trade in goods of all sized orders. An economic system is thus made up of
these competing tributary areas superimposed on one another.
The model of defense includes elements which are similarly superimposed
in geographic space. In Central Asia, the claims of nationalism are analogous to
an economic low-order good: they are confined to a limited area and generally do
not extend beyond republic borders. But the element of collective defense is a
relatively high-order good since it extends beyond national boundaries. Uzbek and
Russian intervention in the Tadjikistan Civil War is an example of a clash in which
the low-order good of ethnicity and the high-order good of collective defense come
into conflict.
The national myths of Russia include Ukraine as historically lying "inside" of
the Russian state. For a Ukrainian nationalist, the national myths see Ukraine as
having a related, but distinctly separate existence.
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By considering each element separately, and assessing the relative
geographic extent of claims of all the actors, it is possible to better understand the
motivations for defense, and where conflicts are likely to arise.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left in its wake a number of
contradictions. Those republics which had the status of constituent republics
achieved independence and international recognition. Those which had the status
of Autonomous Republics or Oblasts did not. Just as the Soviet political hierarchy
was relatively blind to the growing nationalities problem, the West does not fully
recognize the problems inherent in these second-order nationalities in the newly
independent republics. This is a problem that will not simply go away. We must
better understand that there are competing claims for the same geographic space.
This is our first error.
The second error is failing to recognize that the elements of the propensity
to defend the same territory may be of a different nature. The Tadjik need for
sovereignty over its own territory competes with the Uzbek and Russian needs for
collective security. In Vietnam, the United States fought against communism. For
many Vietnamese, the war was not about communism or capitalism, but about
sovereignty. In the Falklands War, Argentina fought for the assertion of historic,
legal claims. Britain fought for the right of self-determination. Unless we
understand all sides' motivations, we will not understand the conflict. This will be
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important as the regional actors around the periphery of Russia attempt to
suppress disputes to avoid a contagion of violence from one republic to the next.
The third error is the overestimation of the importance of economics and
politics. The model of defense forces us to confront other issues that drive a
people to militarily defend a given territory. As the situation in the former
Yugoslavian territory illustrates, other motivations can be much more important.
To offer economic aid to the former Soviet republics when the potential conflicts
have only a limited economic aspect is to ignorantly throw money at the issue: it
will not alleviate the problem.
The solution is not an easy one. We must have more analysts and policy
makers who understand foreign cultures. We must invest money in training people
to speak, not only Russian, but Ukrainian, Uzbek, and Lezgin. These analysts
must be able to understand the culture, history, religion, politics, and even the
national myths of the people being studied. They must read the local literature to
understand the aspirations of the people, and over what territory these aspirations
extend. They must travel to these areas and speak to leaders and common
people alike.
The shattering of the Soviet Union has left a legacy which is potentially
extremely dangerous. Neither the United States nor Moscow can afford to ignore
the complexity that exists around the periphery of Russia. The model of defense
for Russia in this thesis is one attempt to deal with this issue.
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